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PUNISHMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY:
UNDERSTANDING AND REFORMING
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS IN AMERICA
Donald Braman

*

The vast majority of Americans favor sanctions that require offenders to
engage in responsible behavior—to work, pay restitution, or support dependents;
to participate in a mandatory job training, literacy, or drug treatment program;
or to meet some other prosocial obligation. While this intuitive preference crosses
political and ideological divides, nothing in our classical theories of punishment
properly accounts for or develops this intuition. In this Article, Donald Braman
explores the popular preference for and the benefits that attach to these
accountability-reinforcing sanctions.
Reviewing existing and original
ethnographic, interview, and survey data, he describes why these sanctions have
such broad appeal, and he advances a theory that suggests a number of benefits
that are generally ignored when evaluating sanctions in terms of deterrence and
rehabilitation. He concludes by reviewing and suggesting ways to reform existing
punishment practices in light of accountability concerns.
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INTRODUCTION
Take a trip to a neighborhood where crime rates are high, and you will
find that the debates and theories popular with legal academics have little
bearing on the concerns of ordinary people. Few who live in crime-ridden
neighborhoods are worked up over restrictions on the rights of criminal

53:5

Braman 2

Braman Final Read

(5/2/2006 3:48 PM)

Punishment & Accountability

3

suspects and defendants,1 even fewer would demand any kind of
decriminalization,2 and just about no one is overwrought about the decline
3
of judicial discretion. But neither are they eager for more intrusive law
4
enforcement, broader criminalization,5 or further restrictions on judicial
6
autonomy. And when talking about the way criminal punishment affects
their lives, their approach is remarkably innocent of theoretical debates
over the primacy of deterrence or retribution.7 Although they care about
crime and punishment, their concerns run along different lines.
These concerns emerge fairly quickly when talking with someone like
Londa,8 who is caring for her daughter and two sons fathered by her
incarcerated ex-husband: “What does he do for them or for me?
Nothing. . . . At least have him do something for the [kids]. Or anything,
or anybody, you know? Something for the community. They all need to be
doing something.”9 Or when talking with Barbara, who lives across town
from Londa and is caring for her grandnephew while his father is
incarcerated. She vehemently objects to sanctions she sees as fostering,
instead of fighting, irresponsible behavior: “He doesn’t do a thing in
there. . . . You have to make these boys do the right thing. They won’t do it

1.
Cf. DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE (1999) (arguing for more expansive rights for
criminal suspects and defendants).
2.
Cf. SAM STALEY, DRUG POLICY AND THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN CITIES (1992)
(arguing for the decriminalization of drug possession); Steven B. Duke, Drug Prohibition: An
Unnatural Disaster, 27 CONN. L. REV. 571 (1995) (same).
3.
Cf. KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998) (reviewing sentencing practices after the Federal Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3551–3742 (2000)), and arguing that federal judges have too little discretion).
4.
Cf. TRACEY L. MEARES & DAN M. KAHAN, URGENT TIMES: POLICING AND RIGHTS
IN INNER-CITY COMMUNITIES (1999) (arguing that police should be allowed to conduct
unannounced searches of apartments with prior consent).
5.
Cf. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997) (defending expansive
drug laws).
6.
Cf. Alberto Gonzales, U.S. Att’y Gen., Sentencing Guidelines Speech (June 21,
2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2005/06212005victimsofcrime.htm (urging
Congress to further restrict judicial discretion in the wake of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005), which granted judges too much discretion in sentencing).
7.
Cf. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961
(2001) (arguing for the priority of welfare concerns over fairness concerns when assessing legal
policies).
8.
Interviews were conducted in the course of two research projects. The research
methods and findings of the first project, an investigation of the effects of criminal sanctions on
family and community life, are reported in DONALD BRAMAN, DOING TIME ON THE OUTSIDE
(2004). The methods and findings of the second project are reported at The Cultural Cognition
Project, http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition (last visited Apr. 1, 2006).
9.
Interview with Londa, in Wash., D.C. (June 7, 1998) (on file with author).
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on their own.”10 Similar sentiments are echoed by Carl, a former cop in
Londa’s community who was mugged by drug addicts while searching for his
crack-addicted son, and who has spent his life savings taking care of his
grandsons and trying to get his son into treatment. He too is distressed by
how unconstructive punishment has become: “The whole approach is not
right. . . . It’s not right, and everyone who’s involved knows it’s not right.
Just look what it’s doing to our community. . . . If we can’t make them
participate [in drug treatment] while they’re in custody, you have to ask
what the point is.”11 Londa, Barbara, Carl, and many others are dismayed
by the criminal justice system’s failure to require offenders to meet any kind
of constructive obligation at all.
While one might imagine that these attitudes are limited to the inner
city, in fact they extend to a substantial majority of Americans.12 Traveling
the country for a project on American values and the law, I interviewed as
diverse an array of citizens as one is likely to find.13 And while they disagree
on many subjects, the concerns expressed in communities far less intimate
with crime and punishment are strikingly similar to those voiced by innercity residents. Carla, a conservative young mother who lives in a gated
community, for example, wants to make “moral” behavior a required part of
punishment: “Make them do something for society.”14 Paul, a self-described
part-time mechanic and full-time hunter in rural Louisiana protested that
“giving grown men food, shelter, and entertainment, that’s not
right. . . . They need to be put to work.”15 And George, a conservative midlevel corporate manager in California, thinks that the state’s failure to force
offenders to contribute something back to society is not just a waste, but
fundamentally wrong: “I wouldn’t call that justice. . . . [T]hey should have
to do something.”16
I suspect that most readers will intuitively grasp the sense of justice
invoked: Offenders should be held accountable in more meaningful and
productive ways. But nothing in our classical theories of punishment
properly accounts for or develops this intuition. Couched in terms that are
neither liberal nor conservative, hard to map onto theories of deterrence,
10.
Interview with Barbara, in Wash., D.C. (May 12, 1999) (on file with author).
11.
Interview with Carl, in Wash., D.C. (Apr. 19, 2000) (on file with author).
12.
See infra Part III (analyzing public opinion in greater detail).
13.
These interview participants were chosen because they had diverse values. See The
Cultural Cognition Project, supra note 8 (describing those orienting values and related projects for
which the interview data were collected).
14.
Interview with Carla, in Midlothian, Va. (Aug. 24, 2004) (on file with author).
15.
Interview with Paul, in Lake Charles, La. (July 12, 2004) (on file with author).
16.
Interview with Geroge, in Carmel, Cal. (June 7, 1998) (on file with author).
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retribution, or rehabilitation, the views of ordinary Americans are more
nuanced than conventional labels suggest. It should come as no surprise
that ordinary people know more than the experts do about what it is they
want from the law, but it is puzzling to see the theory and practice of
punishment in America so unmoored from the experiences and concerns of
people who are the object of the law’s protection.
In this Article, I investigate a popular preference for what I call
“accountability-reinforcing sanctions.” For the people I have spoken with,
the desire for greater offender accountability can mean many things:
requiring offenders to complete involuntary drug treatment, apologize to
and compensate victims, participate in mandatory education or job-training
programs, meet mandatory work requirements, support dependants, pay
taxes, or comply with some other prosocial obligation. But it cannot
mean—and this is what many find so distressing about what criminal
sanctions now entail—being excused from responsibilities and thus drawing
down the social and material resources of others.
As I argue in Part I, this popular preference for more demanding
accountability-reinforcing sanctions is justifiable on independent normative
grounds. Perhaps its foremost justification is that accountability furthers
norms of cooperation and responsible behavior. When individuals feel that
free riders will be forced back into a cooperative stance, prosocial norms are
strengthened and other community members are encouraged to reciprocate
with socially-responsible behavior themselves. But when free riders are
excused from their obligations by forced inactivity—as most offenders now
are—these norms suffer and free riding gains legitimacy.
Furthermore, unlike our current regime of accountability-frustrating
sanctions, accountability-reinforcing sanctions produce a number of
positive secondary effects that promote prosocial norms. For example, in
communities where sanctions currently excuse offenders from many basic
social obligations, enforcing more responsible behavior makes social ties
more predictable and rewarding, thereby bolstering relationships that help
with informal norm enforcement. They also help communities defend
against many of the stigmatizing effects associated with our current regime
of sanctions, effects that cast aspersions on the character and abilities of all
those who live in communities where crime and punishment are common.
And, by more closely approximating the form of punishment that citizens
consider to be just, sanctions that feature this more demanding form of
accountability encourage greater compliance with and cooperation within
the law.
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The preference for and potential benefits of accountability-reinforcing
sanctions beg the question of why they are so rare today, a question I
explore in Part II. A look at the evolution of sanctions in America reveals
that early American forms of punishment, including the early penitentiary,
while responsive to these concerns, were also brutal and, quite often, racist.
Over time, as reformers restrained the criminal law from furthering
inegalitarian and antisocial norms, they also inadvertently undermined its
ability to enforce egalitarian and prosocial norms as well. Americans thus
look back on the steady move toward mass detention with mixed emotions:
Although less overtly cruel or racially exploitative, punishment today also
lacks some basic tools for countering social disorder and furthering offender
accountability.
This, of course, is not the standard reading of the history of American
punishment. The reigning explanation of the rise of incarceration is
provided by theories of popular punitiveness. According to the proponents
of this theory, it is the public who has driven punishment toward
irrationally punitive sentences, despite the burdens that they place on
disadvantaged communities, the nearly unanimous opposition of experts,
and the immense burden on the public fisc. But as I argue in Part III, an
alternative account, one that recognizes the public’s desire for greater
accountability, proves both more accurate and more promising. A desire for
greater offender accountability explains, for example, the mixture of disgust
and nostalgia that many feel for early American sanctions. Moreover, a
growing body of public opinion research indicates broad opposition to
sanctions that are merely punitive, and broad support for sanctions that
force offenders into responsible action. Indeed, much of what we know
about public sentiment from ethnographic, historical, and public opinion
data on punishment appears incoherent without reference to
accountability.
Are there ways to give accountability greater weight in the structuring
of criminal sanctions while avoiding historical abuses? In Part IV, I
describe several practical efforts that can be made both more productive
and satisfying in light of accountability concerns: the victim compensation
movement; the shift toward mandatory drug treatment, education, and job
training; the increased interest in correctional labor; the continued
popularity of intensive sanctions; and the rising interest in restorative
justice. Revisiting each of these efforts with a richer conception of the role
of accountability in punishment can help us to see their promise, their
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limitations, and the ways in which they might be altered or combined to
better effect.

I.

PUNISHMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Promises to hold offenders more accountable pervade our political
discourse, and our criminal justice system has experimented with a variety
of means to this end. But despite their ubiquity today and historically,
there is little to suggest that accountability concerns are well understood by
contemporary legal theorists or practitioners. We have very thin
explanations for why accountability-reinforcing sanctions should be
desirable, little to say about what features of punishment actually further
accountability in practice, and few discussions of how these accountabilityrelated concerns relate to longstanding accounts of punishment.
In this part, I describe features of accountability that often are
overlooked in discussions of punishment—features that relate to both
popular concerns about, and the practical social effects of, specific forms of
punishment. Rather than focusing on the typical understanding of offender
accountability as imposing some generically costly consequence for actions
barred by criminal laws, I focus on the extent to which criminal sanctions
reinforce broader norms of social accountability. Different sanctions may
impose similar costs on an offender, but may also allow for, encourage, or
enforce other irresponsible behavior that injures nonoffenders. To the
extent that punishment focuses narrowly on the costs internalized by
offenders, it will often miss these concerns about broader accountabilityrelated aspects of punishment, and fail to reflect consideration of the
practical effects that reinforcing or frustrating accountability may have.
Focusing on accountability can broaden our conception of the fairness,
utility, and expressive qualities of sanctions beyond the typical
considerations provided by classical theories of punishment.
A. Accountability as a Preference
1.

In the Inner City

If you want to know what is missing from the theory and practice of
punishment today, visit just about any inner-city neighborhood and spend
some time talking about criminal sanctions with the families who live
there. In public housing projects and Section 8 tenements around the
country, you will find people coping with the double burdens of crime and
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mass incarceration. Sit down with the mothers on one of the blocks where
crime and punishment have made men scarce and you are likely to hear
stories like Londa’s.
Londa lives in a small housing project in our nation’s capital with her
three children, and she is intimately familiar with both the burdens of
criminal sanctions and the social ills at which they are directed. Derek, her
ex-husband and the father of her children, is incarcerated on a drug-related
burglary charge. For her, for their children, and for their extended families,
Derek’s incarceration is decidedly unjust—unjust not so much for Derek as
for them, unjust because it holds him unaccountable in ways that matter.
Londa’s complaint is one that I heard over and over in talking to families in
the inner city: “Out here, I have to pay the bills, I have to raise the kids on
my own, I have to go to work. He doesn’t help with any of that. He
doesn’t even have to get drug treatment.”17 Her prescription is one I heard
many times as well:
They need to make all these guys participate [in programs,] not just
[the] people who want it. They look at people who want the help,
and they help them first, and then if we have some time, then we’ll
get to the other people that didn’t come and sign up, you know?
That’s wrong. That’s wrong. Everybody should have to do the
18
program.

When I asked Londa what she meant by “program,” she described both a
program that addresses addiction and programs that require offenders to
work.
After years of trying, Londa found she just couldn’t face another cycle
of addiction, arrest, incarceration without treatment, and release, so she
filed for divorce. Londa is distraught about what it will mean for her
children to grow up with a father in prison, and she is painfully aware that
her family has come to fit the stereotype of a broken family that hangs over
everyone in her community. The stereotypes of irresponsible, povertystricken, fatherless families are, she and many others in her community feel,
reinforced by state-sanctioned punishments that further irresponsibility,
poverty, and family disintegration. After over a decade of trying to keep
her family together, Londa feels the frustration with Derek’s
unaccountability to her and their children, and the loss that comes with
divorce, all the more keenly.

17.
18.

53:5

Braman 2

Interview with Londa, supra note 9.
Id.

Braman Final Read

(5/2/2006 3:48 PM)

Punishment & Accountability

9

Londa’s complaint, to be clear, is not just that there are not enough
resources devoted to offender rehabilitation, but that our current approach,
even where it devotes resources to offender rehabilitation, is wrong. It’s not
enough to provide offenders with optional services; the state should require
offenders to behave more responsibly. “A lot of these guys, they just aren’t
going to do anything unless they have to. So unless you want the same
thing over and over, with them doing the same thing, you have to make
them do it, [even] the ones that don’t want to.”19 And this, she believes, is
important to members of the community, particularly the family, even if it
fails to help the offender. “Even if it doesn’t stick, if they backslide or
whatever, you still want to know that they are going to do the process, you
know? That, just even you knowing that they [are] doing something, it
gives you that little positive to think about, [and] that’s important.”20
Londa and others in Derek’s family would love for Derek to leave his drug
habit behind for good,21 but even if he fail to do so, they want the state to
make him try.
Nor is Londa’s complaint unusual. Among the families I spoke with,
the complaint about offenders abandoning their responsibilities—from work
to parenting to getting treatment for addiction—was an integral part of the
nearly universal complaint about the cost that this abandonment imposed
on others. Like Londa, many wanted to know why their neighbors, friends,
and relatives, who clearly had drug problems, were not required to complete
a drug treatment program. But they also wanted to know why offenders
simply sat around all day doing nothing. Why couldn’t the state force them
into some kind of productive activity—either community service or paid
labor that helps to compensate victims, support dependants, or at the very
least contribute to the tax base. They were frustrated both with offenders

19.
Id.
20.
Id.
21.
Derek’s sister, for example, asked a question that echoed concerns paralleled by others
in her neighborhood:
[Wealthy people] got people, big people, helping them, pulling them out of situations.
And when people, little people, get like that, that’s a different story. For them, they get
thrown away in jail and locked up, while people that’s on in high places, they’ll take
them somewhere privately to a program, and then they get clean. Then they’re around
positive people and live in positive areas. But they don’t do the same thing for people
that’s small people—they just throw them away in jail instead of them trying to say,
“Well . . . [i]f you spend such and such time in jail, and then you go from jail to a
program . . . until you prove to me that I can trust you to go from step one to step two to
step three.” You know? That’s what I believe. That’s what I see. I mean, why they
don’t see that?
BRAMAN, supra note 8, at 58.
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for engaging in behavior that effectively rendered them unable to meet
their obligations and with the state for failing to push offenders to engage in
responsible behavior.
For example, Mildred, whose son is a prisoner, assists with the care of
her grandchildren. She noted that she and other nonoffenders were doing
the work of all those moving in and out of prison: “It gets you frustrated to
the point where you begin to dislike your own family. You begin to think
that all the sacrifices you made, all that work you put in, it don’t amount to
nothing.”22 Most, like Mildred, had little patience for offenders or the state.
Both, she and others felt, were not doing what they should. The criminal
justice system, for many, seemed to be part of a (possibly intentional)
program that was disassembling their families and communities.
Those who work on the frontlines of the criminal justice system are
often aware of these concerns, in no small part because they often live in
the same communities and have relatives caught up in the criminal justice
system themselves. Carl, the former police officer who once worked a beat
in Londa’s neighborhood, certainly felt this way. He has spent his
retirement savings taking care of his grandsons while their father serves a
prison sentence for possession of crack cocaine, and he is frustrated with
how unproductive sanctions have become. “You can’t just do this to a
family, to a whole community and expect it to function. It’s not right. You
have got to find a way to get [offenders] to start doing the things they need
to do.”23 Carl’s complaint is one that is both personal and more broadly
political. He views the state’s indifference to his son’s addiction as part of a
broader indifference to the erosion of the basic structure of family and
community life in low-income neighborhoods like his.
Barbara, who lives across town from Londa, has similar concerns about
her nephew’s incarceration. After her sister’s death and her nephew’s
arrest, Barbara is the only one left in the family able to take care of her
nephew’s son—a child she loves but whose expenses force her to trade off
food, rent, and electricity on a regular basis.24 Like many inner-city
residents, Barbara is a crime victim who insists that she is “tough on
crime.”25 But she also vehemently objects to sanctions that she see as
fostering, instead of fighting, irresponsible behavior. She’s not upset that
her nephew is being punished: “I believe that if you do the crime you had
22.
Interview with Mildred, in Wash., D.C. (Dec. 3, 1999) (on file with author).
23.
Interview with Carl, supra note 11.
24.
See BRAMAN, supra note 8, at 97–98 (describing Barbara’s account in greater detail).
Many of the expenses that she has trouble meeting are medical.
25.
Interview with Barbara, supra note 10.
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better do the time.”26 But Barbara is upset that his sentence is so long and
unproductive: “He doesn’t do a thing in there.”27 She is frustrated both
with her nephew for putting himself in a position in which he is incapable
of acting responsibly and with the criminal justice system for enforcing his
irresponsibility:
He can work. He’s not disabled or anything. I don’t know why they
can’t just put all of them to work. . . . The thing that really ticks me
off is they take the bread winner out of the house, [but don’t think
about] the earnings or the medical expenses or clothing or whatever
that he was contributing. . . . They take away but they don’t give
28
back.

This attitude, neither strictly liberal nor conservative, doesn’t shy from
punishing offenders, but suggests that there are some qualities of just
punishment that are missing from incarceration alone. Strikingly common
in high-crime communities, Barbara’s objection is that existing sanctions
fail to consider nonoffenders when evaluating whether or not a sanction is
truly just.
Others I spoke with were concerned about the failure of sanctions to
push offenders into greater responsibility-taking in general. A reverend,
whose congregation is a few blocks from Londa’s home, speaks eloquently
about the effects of removing so many young men from the community:
You can’t have a community where all the young men are in prison.
You can’t have families where the fathers are removed from their
place as providers for the family. Just walk down the street out there
and you see what I’m saying. That is the reality people have to live
with here. . . . Now everyone wants to fight crime, that’s a given in
this community because there are more victims than criminals—
everyone in this community is a victim [of crime] in one way or
another. So no one is opposed to serving justice to the people who
29
are doing wrong. But what you see is not justice.

The reverend suggests that many in his congregation view mass
incarceration as unjust not only to the offender or to his family, but to the
community as a whole.
What is missing from many discussions of punishment, both among
liberal and conservative elites, is this intuition that sanctions are, in social
26.
27.
28.
29.
author).

53:5

Braman 2

Interview with Barbara, supra note 10.
BRAMAN, supra note 8, at 97–98.
Interview with Barbara, supra note 10.
Interview with Reveredn Mobley, in Wash., D.C. (Oct. 14, 1999) (on file with

Braman Final Read

(5/2/2006 3:48 PM)

12

53 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1 (2006)

terms, both too injurious to disadvantaged communities and insufficiently
demanding of offenders. Most of the people who live in communities where
both crime and punishment are common aren’t opposed to being tough on
offenders, even to incarcerating offenders who are violent or at a high risk
of committing another offense. But they are distraught by a lack of any
prosocial demands made of those offenders, in or out of prison.
2.

Across America

Forcing offenders to behave responsibly is an understandable
preference in the inner city—those who live there are overexposed to what
economists might describe as the negative “externalities”30 of punishment.
But residents in very different communities voice a strikingly similar set of
preferences. Over the last two years, I’ve traveled the country interviewing
as diverse a sample of Americans as one is likely to find, and while they
disagree on many subjects—abortion, gun control, and environmental
regulation, for example—on the issue of punishment they generally voice
similar disappointment with sanctions that fail to demand some form of
responsible behavior from offenders.31
This was true not only in areas that had urban, wealthy, or progressive
residents, but also in relatively conservative neighborhoods isolated from
poverty and crime. Janice, a “traditionalist” mother of three who lives and
works on a military base in southern Virginia, finds the idea of extended
periods of empty detention decidedly unsatisfying: “I feel like they are doing
nothing, you know, or worse. . . . Why not make them do something good
for a change?”32 No one in her family is in prison, and a change in criminal
sanctions would have only a very indirect impact on her life. Nonetheless,
she too finds the idea of idleness itself upsetting. “Honestly,” she says, “I
33
like the idea of making them work.”
Carla, a self-described suburban “soccer mom” who lives in a gated
community nearby has little time for sanctions that she sees as encouraging
idleness: “There should be some real consequence [for committing a crime].
You know the old saying, ‘idle hands are the devil’s workshop.’ I believe

30.
See, e.g., E.J. MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: AN INFORMAL INTRODUCTION 119
(3d ed. 1982) (defining an externality as a “direct effect on another’s profit or welfare arising as an
incidental by-product of some . . . activity”).
31.
Interview participants were chosen because they had diverse values. See supra note 13.
32.
Interview with Janice, in Williamsburg, Va. (Aug. 8, 2004) (on file with author).
33.
Id.
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that, so there’s a lot of room for improvement there in my opinion.”34 Part
of the problem, Carla believes, is that sanctions send confusing signals,
asking offenders to pay for their crimes by doing something that seems
wrong: doing nothing at all. “If you think about it, that’s mixed up. It’s
like a mixed message.”35 Carla also believes that everyone is redeemable, a
position supported by her faith: “God never gives up on a person just like a
parent never gives up on a child. There are consequences, and your child
may not like them, in fact may rebel against them, but it is your job to make
sure that they know right from wrong. . . . [Part of that] involves making
sure that they do the right thing so that they learn by doing.”36
Paul, who lives in rural Louisiana, likes the idea of making offenders
work too, but he views punishment from the perspective of someone who
values self-sufficiency and individual responsibility. A bit of a traditionalist
and a bit of a libertarian, Paul is a fan of small government and opposed to
social welfare programs, and he does not think that prisoners deserve the
option of a work program for their own benefit. Instead, for him it’s a
question of fairness: “They have a roof over their head, they get three meals
a day, they get television or whatever. . . . You and me, we have to work for
that. They need to be put to work.”37 He feels strongly that there should be
consequences for harming others, but he sees prisons as expensive and
largely counterproductive, allowing people with bad tendencies to spend
time socializing and learning how to evade the law more effectively, “like
training for how to be a criminal.”38 If they’re not violent, he says, they
should work outside of the prison to pay for what they did.
George, the conservative mid-level corporate manager from California
who finds prisoner idleness to be unjust, is also adamant about demanding
that offenders do things that benefit others. For violent or dangerous
offenders, they should be in prison, but they should also be working, either
by contracting prison labor or by having them work for the state:
If you can have them work at a real job, great. But if there’s not
paying jobs, they shouldn’t just sit around. . . . The way I see it, they
took and they should have to put something back. Have them pick
up trash on the highway. Have them put out wildfires. But you need
to have them doing something besides just spending our tax dollars,

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
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watching cable, and lifting weights. I guess I take that [phrase] “pay
39
your debt to society” seriously.

If someone commits a nonviolent crime, George says, “Make him work and
pay for it.”40 Even when it comes to chronic drug addicts who repeatedly
offend, he wants more from punishment: “Send that guy to a program, clean
him up, then make him work to pay back for what he did.”41 Asked why he
wouldn’t incarcerate these offenders, his reasoning is straightforward: “They
don’t do anything in prison. He’s not working and paying taxes to support
me, so why should I work and pay taxes to support him?”42
Annie, a lawyer who lives in Boston, is also interested in pushing
offenders into some form of responsible, constructive behavior as a way of
making the most of the necessity of state control. She is distressed by the
way the state captures and then squanders human capital from
neighborhoods where it is desperately needed. “Instead of locking them up,
which is such a waste, have them do something constructive. I mean, all
this human warehousing is wrong, because that’s what it is, it’s human
warehousing, just taking them out of their neighborhoods and stacking
them up in prison.”43 The neighborhoods they come from should be
protected from crime, she believes, by some form of punishment that is less
destructive and wasteful. “I just can’t believe that this is the best we can
do. I mean whatever happened to all the programs that we used to have?
You know? Why aren’t they doing something positive?”44 Moreover, as
many egalitarian respondents I interviewed pointed out, mass incarceration
seems particularly offensive because it removes human capital from the
families and communities who can least afford the loss. “The real tragedy is
that there are so many fathers in prison. Why don’t politicians ever talk
about that? Why is it just ‘lock them up’?”45
In short, the preference for enforcing responsible behavior stems from
many motivations, and these motivations appear to vary from person to
person. A single mother like Londa living in our nation’s capital; a
conservative businessman like Carl, living in a posh neighborhood three
thousand miles away; and a rural blue-collar worker like Paul, living on the

39.
Interview with George, supra note 16.. In California, crews from juvenile detention
camps and low-security prisons sometimes assist in fighting wildfires.
40.
Id.
41.
Id.
42.
Id.
43.
Interview with Annie, in __ (Aug. 24, 2004) (on file with author).
44.
Id.
45.
Id.

53:5

Braman 2

Braman Final Read

(5/2/2006 3:48 PM)

Punishment & Accountability

15

bayou in Louisiana, are unlikely to share all of each other’s interests,
intuitions, and insights about how society should be structured, how
Americans should conduct their lives, or the moral architecture that
justifies a particular punishment. But despite their diverse motivations,
they agree on a surprising number of sanctions.
B.

Accountability and Traditional Punishment Theory

What, if anything, can these accountability-related concerns teach
legal theorists? One set of lessons suggests that the terms in which we
typically discuss punishment—retribution, desert, deterrence, expressive
condemnation, and rehabilitation—miss important and widespread
concerns. Attending to these concerns can help theorists think in terms
that are still consistent with their broader commitments but better reflect
the diversity of considerations that most people bring to bear when they
evaluate the form punishment takes.
1.

Fairness Concerns Exceeding Retribution

The preference for accountability is not, for example, reducible to
traditional conceptions of retributivism, at least not in the classical sense.46
While many of those interviewed were interested in increasing the fairness
of punishment,47 they viewed fairness as more than simply delivering to the
offender “what his actions are worth.”48 As Londa’s complaint makes clear,
she is at least as interested in what she, her children, and her community
deserve49 as she is in what her husband deserves.50 Nor does the idea that
46.
See IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 194–98 (W. Hastie trans., Lawbook
Exchange ed. 2002) (1887) (“But what is the mode and measure of Punishment which Public
Justice takes as its Principle and Standard? It is just the Principle of Equality, by which the
pointer of the Scale of Justice is made to incline no more to one side than the other.”); RICHARD
G. SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT (1979); ANDREW
VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976); Herbert Morris, Persons
and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475 (1968) (arguing that punishment must right the unfair advantage
that lawbreakers gain over those who respect that law); see also ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL
EXPLANATIONS 363–97 (1981) (suggesting that the level of punishment should vary according to
the level of responsibility and the harm caused).
47.
Cf. Morris, supra note 46, at 477–78 (describing punishment as an attempt to achieve a
fair balance of burdens in light of the offender’s failure to shoulder the burden of lawful behavior
to which other citizens submit).
48.
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 102 (John Ladd trans.,
Bobbs-Merrill ed. 1965) (1797).
49.
Cf. Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 111, 125 (Jeffrie
G. Murphy & Jean Hampton eds., 1988) (describing one of the expressive functions of the law as
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offenders should be required to engage in some form of prosocial activity
appear consistent with the notion that the offenders, by committing crimes,
commit themselves to having the same or a similar harms committed
against them.51 Many of the interviewees’ responses reflect the notion that
requiring an offender to complete some form of prosocial action is, in many
instances, part of just punishment. Retribution is an important part of the
public’s complex conception of justice, but it does not exhaust it.
2.

Welfare Concerns Exceeding Deterrence

Nor does the preference for accountability-reinforcing sanctions
appear to be reducible to concerns about deterrence, either.52 Indeed,
although many of those interviewed decried the disutility of punishment
when describing their preference for accountability-reinforcing sanctions,
even connecting individual sanctions to welfare-related concerns, few
connected their preference with the cost-benefit calculus of those
contemplating a criminal act. Instead, they complained about the loss of a
resource to their families, communities, and society as a whole.53 This
preference is difficult to reduce to deterrence because it extends beyond the
cost-benefit analyses of those contemplating a crime—beyond the expected
utility of crime to a broader utility of punishment that incorporates but is
not limited to deterrence effects.

restoring public status to victims); Morris, supra note 46, at 477–78 (arguing that punishment
must right the unfair advantage that lawbreakers gain over those who respect that law).
50.
Interview with Londa, supra note 9 (“What does he do for them or for me?
Nothing. . . . At least have him do something for the [kids]. Or anything, or anybody, you know?
Something for the community. They all need to be doing something.”); cf. Michael S. Moore, The
Moral Worth of Retribution: New Essay in Moral Psychology, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND
THE EMOTIONS 179, 181 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987) (“A retributivist punishes because, and
only because, the offender deserves it.”).
51.
This is a well-worn complaint against the classical retributivist theories. See, e.g., C.L.
TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT (1987).
52.
See JEREMY BENTHAM, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in THE
UTILITARIANS 170 (Dolphin Books 1961) (describing punishment as deterring potential offenders
by raising the costs associated with criminal acts); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968) (formalizing the argument for deterrence in the
language of neoclassical economics).
53.
See supra note 43 and accompanying text. (“Instead of locking them up, which is such
a waste, have them do something constructive.”).
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Expressive Concerns Exceeding Condemnation

While there is often an expressive element to the interest in
accountability-reinforcing sanctions, it is one that is broader than
traditional expressivist accounts of punishment suggest. Expressive theories
hold that punishment conveys the importance of the norms marked out by
the law to the degree of condemnation that a sanction conveys.54 However,
the public’s preference for accountability-reinforcing sanctions indicates
that punishment can convey social meaning along other dimensions as well.
When, for example, the citizens of California vote by popular referenda to
implement mandatory labor requirements throughout its prison system, it
seems likely that they are attempting to do more than express
condemnation; they are also trying to convey an additional normative
sentiment: Offenders cannot escape the constraint of responsible behavior
through punishment. Indeed, the impulse behind laws establishing
requirements, such as victim compensation, restitution, mandatory drug
treatment, mandatory education, mandatory child support, anger
management classes, public apologies, and the like, are best thought of as
expressing something in addition to “vindictive resentment.”55 Punishment
is a mechanism through which citizens can both condemn criminal acts and
protect norms governing responsible behavior outside of the scope of the
criminal law.
4.

Beyond the Rehabilitative Ideal

Accountability-related concerns are also distinct from one of the
central progressive accounts of punishment: the rehabilitative ideal.
54.
As James Fitzjames Stephen noted:
Some men, probably, abstain from murder because they fear that, if they committed
murder, they would be hung. Hundreds of thousands abstain from it because they regard
it with horror. One great reason why they regard it with horror is, that murderers are
hung with the hearty approbation of all reasonable men.
JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 99 (1863).
See also e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean? 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 598
(1996) (“Under the expressive view, the signification of punishment is moral condemnation.”). I
do not mean to say that traditional expressive accounts insist that the only meaning that
punishment conveys is condemnation, but rather that the other meanings that are widely
discussed are all tightly clustered around this meaning. Thus, while Joel Feinberg concedes that
“[i]t is much easier to show that punishment has a symbolic significance than to state exactly what
it is that punishment expresses,” he does not venture beyond adding “vindictive resentment” to
“strong disapproval.” JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF
RESPONSIBILITY 100 (1970).
55.
FEINBERG, supra note 54, at 100.
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Whereas rehabilitative theories focus on endowing offenders with the
capacity to support themselves lawfully and the psychological fortitude to
resist illicit temptations,56 the interest in accountability is independent of
these kinds of therapeutic effects.57 Indeed, as I describe in greater detail
below, it is precisely the focus on the offender’s obligation to behave
responsibly without any necessary benefit to the offender that allows
individuals with diverse motivations to agree on the desirability of
accountability-reinforcing sanctions.
C.

The Utility of Accountability

As I describe in greater detail in Part III, there is a wealth of public
opinion data suggesting that the preference for enforcing responsible
behavior is widely shared across ideological and political lines. While
popularity is not, in and of itself, a compelling justification for a law or
policy,58 an intuition that is widely shared should not be dismissed out of
hand. When a sizeable majority of citizens with diverse interests and

56.
See, e.g., KARL MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 253–68 (1968); BARBARA
WOOTTON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A MAGISTRATE AND SOCIAL
SCIENTIST (1963); Karl Menninger, Therapy, Not Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND
REHABILITATION 132 (Jeffrie G. Murphy ed., 1973); Richard Wasserstrom, Some Problems with
Theories of Punishment, in JUSTICE AND PUNISHMENT 173, 180 (J.B. Cederblom & William L.
Blizek eds., 1977) (noting a view among psychiatrists that “we ought never punish persons who
break the law and that we ought instead to do something much more like what we do when we
treat someone who has a disease.”); see also FRANCES A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE
REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE 23, 25 (1981) (describing the
rehabilitative ideal as deriving from confidence “in the social capacities of public education” and
“institutional therapeutic programs”); DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY:
A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY (1990) (describing the shift in criminological thought).
57.
Perhaps they felt, as Kyron Huigens does, that “this therapeutic approach to crime is
paternalistic: it infantilizes where we ought to insist on adult accountability.” Kyron Huigens,
Dignity and Desert in Punishment Theory, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 33, 35 (2003).
58.
Indeed, the law often guards policy choices against the majoritarian influence because
popularity is so imperfectly aligned with carefully considered conceptions of justice and utility.
This is apparent in not only the protection of the Constitution from tampering by a simple
majority, but also by the protection of presidential veto from a simple majority in Congress. See,
e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, at 446 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(discussing the desirability of requiring a supermajority to override a presidential veto). As
Hamilton wrote:
It is to be hoped that it will not often happen that improper views will govern so large a
proportion as two thirds of both branches of the legislature at the same time; and this,
too, in defiance of the counterpoising weight of the executive. It is at any rate far less
probable that this should be the case than that such views should taint the resolutions
and conduct of a bare majority.
Id.
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perspectives shares a preference, it is worth asking whether there might be a
good reason to honor it.
As it turns out—at least in this instance—there are several. Our best
understanding of human behavior and organization suggests that this family
of accountability-reinforcing sanctions can help vulnerable communities
address the core collective-action problems they confront on a daily basis.59
1.

Punishment and Collective Action

Traditional utilitarian accounts of the criminal law can be thought of
as furnishing a solution to a basic collective-action problem. To better
achieve their collective potential, individuals cooperate around a set of
established norms; those who free ride on the trust, cooperation, and
responsibility-taking of others create a collective-action problem.60 To
solve this problem, communities raise the cost of free riding by punishing
defectors, which creates a balance of incentives that once again favors
cooperation. On this account, the main question is whether the expense
and degree of the suffering inflicted by punishment achieve an optimal
balance of benefits through deterrence to outweigh the costs of imposing
the punishment.61
The approach taken here complicates this account by recasting both
crime and punishment as interventions into the social ecology of collective
action,62 and by developing a more realistic account of the ways in which
59.
But before I describe these, let me be clear that this is not a claim that citizens endorse
(or even conceive of punishment in terms of) the defense that I offer here. The defense that I
offer does not depend in any analytic sense on the public agreeing with or even understanding the
normative account that I offer. The central normative argument for accountability-reinforcing
sanctions is not that they are popular or that they conform to a particular conception of justice,
but that on net they provide real-world benefits.
60.
See Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, CAL. L. REV.
1513, 1514 (2002) (characterizing the most general collective-action problem as one in which
“individuals . . . must decide whether to contribute to the collective good of respect for one
another’s persons and property or instead to engage in opportunistic acts of predation”); cf.
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
61.
See BENTHAM, supra note 52, at 162 (“[A]ll punishment is mischief: all punishment in
itself is evil. Upon the principle of utility, if it ought at all to be admitted, it ought only to be
admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil.”); John J. Donohue, Fighting Crime:
An Economist’s View, MILKEN INST. REV. Mar. 2005 (1st Qtr.), at 46, 48, available at
http://islandia.law.yale.edu/donohue/Milken%20Institute%20Article.pdf (“To determine whether
the current level of incarceration makes sense, one must ask whether the benefits at the margin in
terms of less crime exceed the costs to society.”).
62.
See Calvin Morrill et al., Seeing Crime and Punishment Through a Sociological Lens:
Contributions, Practices, and the Future, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 289, 299–302 (Tracey Meares
describing this ecological approach to criminal law).

53:5

Braman 2

Braman Final Read

(5/2/2006 3:48 PM)

20

53 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1 (2006)

actors in a community respond to these interventions. The goal of
collective action is still to allow individuals to make the most of their
capacities by furthering cooperation and discouraging free-ridership. But
the question for analysts under this more complex account of punishment is
not merely about whether and how much to punish, but about the diverse
effects—many of them indirect—that punishment can have on collective
action.
2.

Norms and Networks

Punishment, for example, can influence collective action through its
effects on social norms. As numerous studies have demonstrated over a
wide variety of settings, humans are more likely to cooperate if they think
that others are cooperating. Conversely, they are more likely to free ride if
they think that others are free riding as well.63 So when a person commits a
criminal act, he not only creates the typical harms associated with crime,
but he also imposes a cost of eroding social cooperation—a cost diffused
throughout the community as an increase in the probability that others in
the community will follow suit. Contemporary criminal theory thus looks
to a host of state actions to encourage social cooperation for precisely this
reason.64
These concerns are consistent with several features of substantive
criminal law. The criminalization of solicitation, attempt, and conspiracy,
for example, can be thought of as addressing not the direct harm resulting
from the commission of a crime, but the broader normative harm of
defection implicit in inchoate crimes. Thus while attempt may involve no
direct material harm, defection from norms that the law protects may itself

63.
See, e.g., Samuel Bowles et al., Homo reciprocans: A Research Initiative on the Origins,
Dimensions,
and
Policy
Implications
of
Reciprocal
Fairness
4
(1997),
http://www.umass.edu/preferen/gintis/homo.pdf (describing empirical research indicating that “a
majority of individuals . . . respond to the cooperation of others by maintaining or increasing their
level of cooperation”); Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Reciprocity and Economics: The Economic
Implications of Homo Reciprocans, 42 EUR. ECON. REV. 845, 855 (1998) (noting that reciprocity
studies suggest a model of collective action in which individuals prefer to contribute if they
believe that others are inclined to contribute, but to free ride if they believe that others are
inclined to free ride); Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law,
102 MICH. L. REV. 71 (2003) (describing the legal and policy implications of reciprocity findings).
64.
See Dan M. Kahan, Privatizing Criminal Law: Strategies for Private Norm Enforcement in
the Inner City, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1859, 1860 (1999) (“The 1990s are likely to be remembered as
the decade in which criminal law discovered (or perhaps rediscovered) the power of social norms as
a regulatory device.”).
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be a harm.65 Solicitation and conspiracy may also be considered pernicious,
for they signal both defection from licit norms and the establishment of
cooperation around illicit norms.66 They are thus doubly harmful, not only
producing the kind of defection that can drive a community toward
noncooperation, but moving toward the establishment of cooperation
around antisocial norms.67
Protecting the norm of prosocial cooperation has also featured
prominently in recent discussions of street-level law enforcement. The
“New Policing” is, in many respects, the result of a search for cost-effective
ways to increase collective reciprocation of respect and responsibility-taking
in a community. As community members perceive others in their
community (police and other citizens) cooperating around the enforcement
of licit norms, they, in turn, become more likely to reciprocate by
complying with and helping to enforce the law themselves.68 Ordermaintenance policing thus shapes collective action by altering perceptions
of norm-compliance and building relationships that enable desirable
cooperation.
a. Downstream Effects
An extension of this framework to punishment suggests a number of
predictable effects that punishment is likely to have on collective action.69
One of these can be characterized as a “downstream effect” on social norms:
Because adherence to norms of responsible behavior depends in part on the
perception that others are also adhering to those norms, sanctions that
force offenders out of cooperation and into free-ridership decrease the
likelihood of cooperation and increase the likelihood of free-ridership
among others in the community.
Consider, for example, what has happened with Londa’s husband,
Derek. His individual drug use and thieving directly drives up the rate of
free-ridership in his community, making others less trusting and perhaps
even more likely to free ride themselves. But his incarceration, while
attempting to curb these harms by imposing a cost on Derek for defecting,
65.
This also suggests why impossibility is generally not exculpatory, as the attempt to free
ride can have this effect as well.
66.
Cf. Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307 (2003) (arguing that
the various harmful social effects of conspiracy make it especially worthy of punishment).
67.
Cf. Kahan, supra note 60, at 1513–15 (describing community policing as guarding
against norms of low cooperation).
68.
Kahan, supra note 60 (discussing reciprocity and community policing).
69.
I thank Ryan Goodman for noting the relationship between these effects.

53:5

Braman 2

Braman Final Read

(5/2/2006 3:48 PM)

22

53 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1 (2006)

reinforces them by creating other forms of free-ridership. His failure to
compensate his victims or the community at large for the harm he has
caused signals defection from basic social obligations; his continued failure
to be a responsible father, spouse, brother, and son while incarcerated
signals defection from familial obligations. This signal reaches not only
members of his family, but others in his community as well. His failure to
reform himself, to work, to pay taxes, or to vote, signals a further defection
from his obligations to his family, community, and society at large. While
his detention may deter free-ridership in some ways, it also promotes freeridership by forcing these irresponsible behaviors. Indeed, Derek, while
incarcerated, becomes a free rider extraordinaire, costing everyone
something and contributing little or nothing in return.
Bear in mind, too, that in Londa’s neighborhood incarceration and the
free-ridership that it entails doesn’t just influence the norm among young
men—statistically speaking, it is the norm. Nearly every house on her
block has a family member who has been or is behind bars.70 In the year
during which Derek was arrested, there were sixty-four arrests for drug
possession and distribution within a two-block radius of her residence.71
Over 120 men living within the same two-block radius were admitted to
the D.C. Correctional system during that time, about one-quarter of them
on drug possession or distribution charges. Many others, like Londa’s
husband Derek, were incarcerated on other charges related to drug
addiction.72
Multiply Derek’s defections by the millions of men who spend time in
prison or jail each year, and one begins to grasp how incarceration can alter
basic norms related to family, community, and citizenship in many alreadydisadvantaged communities.73 Humans are social in that they predictably
74
adapt their behavior to what they perceive to be the “going rate” —what
constitutes acceptable and responsible behavior in the relevant reference
group. In communities where most fathers spend time in prison or jail, and
where doing so means not being present for one’s spouse, providing for one’s
children, working, paying taxes, voting, paying one’s debts, or
70.
See BRAMAN, supra note 8, at 21 (describing the high incarceration rate in Londa’s
Washington, D.C. neighborhood).
71.
See id. (citing to D.C. Police Dep’t Data (on file with author)).
72.
Usually fugitive, larceny, burglary, or robbery charges. Id. at n.4.
73.
See id. at 38, 159 (describing the effects of incarceration on social norms in low-income
neighborhoods).
74.
See, e.g., ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT 51 (1999) (describing
husbands who use the “going rate” of behavior among other men they know to justify contributing
less effort than their wives to their marriages).
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compensating one’s victims, the going rate for responsible behavior is
discernibly lowered.
b. Upstream Effects
Punishment can also have significant “upstream effects” on the
willingness of individuals to enter into relationships that enable
cooperation and curb free-ridership: Family, work, church, and other
centers of community life are the principal ties through which prosocial
norms are transmitted and enforced. The best evidence we have suggest
that these ties are not only essential to the long-term health of
communities and all those who live in them, but also to long-term crime
reduction.75 But where individuals perceive others to be defecting from the
obligations that arise within such relationships, they become less likely to
enter into them and more likely to exit them.
In communities like Londa’s—where incarceration is common—many
individuals have learned that they cannot rely on one another for the
fundamental exchanges of care and material goods. This is so because the
criminal justice system prevents so many men from contributing to and
participating in the long-term reciprocal relationships in which such
exchanges occur.76 A substantial body of empirical work now describes how
accountability-frustrating sanctions have been exerting an increasingly
corrosive force on the social ties of citizens in low-income communities,
often operating in ways that frustrate the intent of the law.77
Indeed, the reason that Derek is no longer Londa’s husband is because
she could no longer sustain her commitment to their relationship in light of
his failure to meet his responsibilities. What happens when millions of
women and children have experiences like Londa and her children? The
effects are evident, a series of recent studies now suggest, in the increased
75.
See, e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE (2000) (describing the importance of
informal relationships to individual and collective well-being); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN
WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR 46 (1996) (describing the effects of
declining social ties on crime); Robert J. Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A
Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 SCIENCE 918, 918 (1997) (reporting evidence that
“social cohesion among neighbors combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the
common good” is strongly correlated with reduced levels of violent crime).
76.
See, e.g., BRAMAN, supra note 8, at 154–58 (reviewing the literature and describing its
relevance to criminal sanctions).
77.
See JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME BACK: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF
PRISONER REENTRY (2005) (reviewing this literature); Spencer De Li & Doris Layton MacKenzie,
The Gendered Effects of Adult Social Bonds on the Criminal Activities of Probationers, 28 CRIM. JUST.
REV. 278 (2003).
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fragility and transience of families in neighborhoods where incarceration is
common; in the subtle corrosion of relational norms governing the behavior
of romantic partners; and in the diminished resources that individuals have
access to in a family or community where trust becomes scarce.78 While
incarceration is not solely responsible for the steady decline in the number
and strength of positive social ties in communities with high incarceration
79
rates, it is a significant contributor to that decline.
By pushing offenders back into a cooperative stance, accountabilityreinforcing sanctions can foster the perception of adherence to—and thus
strengthen—the norm of cooperation and responsibility-taking. This, in
turn, encourages continued participation in the social networks essential to
healthy family and community life. Recall that in Londa’s neighborhood
this would not be an effect at the margins; it would alter the behavior of a
substantial majority of young men. What we know of human behavior and
social organization suggests that requiring offenders to engage in responsible
behaviors—completing drug treatment, working, compensating their
victims, supporting their children, paying taxes—would have significant
effects that extend well beyond the offenders themselves.
This is one of my central claims about punishment and accountability:
By reassuring individuals in a community that the state will push offenders
back into responsible behavior, accountability-reinforcing sanctions can
help to increase the likelihood that others in the community will also
behave responsibly. This, in turn, will make it more likely that individuals
will enter into and remain in the prosocial relationships that sustain and are
sustained by that behavior.
3.

Fairness

Punishment also shapes collective action through its effect on
perceptions of fairness. The importance of perceptions of fairness to

78.
See, e.g., Leonard M. Lopoo & Bruce Western, Incarceration and the Formation and
Stability of Marital Unions, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 721, 731 (2005) (finding that, after
controlling for other factors, incarceration increases the likelihood that a man will divorce by 360
percent); Bruce Western & Sara McLanahan, Fathers Behind Bars: The Impact of Incarceration on
Family Formation, 2 CONTEMP. PERSPECT. FAM. RES. 309 (2000) (reporting similar findings on
the effects of incarceration in nonmarital romantic relationships); see also BRAMAN, supra note 8,
at 86–88, 162–63 (describing the effects of incarceration on community norms regarding romantic
and marital relationships).
79.
See BRAMAN, supra note 8, at __.
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cooperation, long assumed by prominent legal theorists,80 has been
thoroughly established across a broad array of recent empirical studies by
Tom Tyler, John Darley, Janice Nadler, and others.81 When citizens
perceive the state to be furthering injustice, these studies suggest, they are
less likely to obey the law, assist law enforcement, or enforce the law
themselves.
The collective action effect at stake here is a familiar one: Individual
residents in a community would all be better off were they to help one
another and the state with law enforcement. But because today’s sanctions
are perceived to be unjust—to innocent citizens as much as to offenders
themselves—legal actors and residents in high-crime neighborhoods are
forced to weigh the perceived injustice of crime against the injustice of
punishment, which undermines cooperation with the law and the criminal
justice system. To the extent that it fails to meet the public’s expectations
of just punishment, our current regime of sanctions works against the
legitimacy of the law itself.
This occurs in some very predictable ways: Londa, for example, was
unwilling to report her husband for stealing their television, stereo, and
other valuables to support his crack habit. This is not because she does not
want to force him into drug treatment—she would love to. She resists
because a regime in which long-term detention is unlikely to include drug
treatment seems to be unnecessarily injurious not only to Derek, but to her,
their children, and the community at large.82 But if she thought that she
could force Derek into drug treatment, she would: “In a second. I wouldn’t
even have to think about it.”83
80.
See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 25 (1968) (arguing that
specific laws failing to satisfy the public’s taste for justice can undermine confidence in the law
more generally).
81.
See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3–4 (1990) (noting that
cooperation with the law and its enforcement is dependent on individuals’ perceptions that the
law is “just”); Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1399 (2005) (reviewing the
literature and reporting new experimental evidence that “the perceived legitimacy of one law or
legal outcome can influence one’s willingness to comply with unrelated laws”); Paul H. Robinson
& John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453 (1997) (arguing that citizens are
less likely to view the law as a moral authority that guides their own behavior in general when
they perceive specific laws as failing to reflect popular notions of justice); see also Tracey L. Meares
et al., Updating the Study of Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1171, 1185 (2004) (“As penalties
increase, people may not be as willing to enforce them because of the disproportionate impact on
those caught.”).
82.
Note that this aversion to helping enforce the law has spillover effects: Londa’s
husband is not just stealing her television, but he is also borrowing money that he will not pay
back from friends and family, stealing cars, and burglarizing homes in his neighborhood.
83.
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Fairness concerns shape more extended forms of noncooperation as
well. Londa, for example, has a host of material incentives to report the
drug dealers in her neighborhood: They may sell drugs to her husband or, in
time, her children; their clients engage in other criminal acts (of which she
herself has been a victim); and they set a bad example for her husband, her
children, and her community (the social norms effect described above).
But she also knows them as the brothers and sons of her friends, and she
can extrapolate from her own experience to theirs:
I don’t think I could get behind taking so many years from them.
You know, I know that getting locked up, it doesn’t help, because
that’s what Derek did. If anything, I think prison just made things
worse. What they need is to give them some structure—they have
84
kids, a lot of them, you know.

While there are many reasons why Londa does not call the police to report
what she knows, she has to weigh this against the perceived injustice that
these men, their families, and their communities would face.
As many legal commentators have noted, the effects of perceived
injustice can extend beyond less cooperative citizens to under-enforcement
in the courtroom as well.85 Few jurors or judges, for example, believe that
selling crack cocaine or possessing heroin should be legal, but at least some
justifiably balk at the socially destructive sanctions that result from
conviction.86 They know, just as Londa and many others in her community
know, that the sanctions available to them are unfair not (or not only) to
the offender, but to the offender’s family and community.
D.

The Rarity of Accountability-Reinforcing Sanctions

But if broader accountability-related concerns are common and the
effects of accountability-related aspects of sanctions are consequential, why
do we have a blight of accountability-frustrating sanctions today? The
narrow focus of our theoretical discourse is only a partial explanation of
why sanctions that foster irresponsible behavior dominate the
contemporary punishment landscape. A more detailed answer will
84.
85.
See Teresa L. Conaway et al., Jury Nullification: A Selective, Annotated Bibliography, 39
VAL. U. L. REV. 393 (2004) (documenting more than one hundred articles on jury nullification
published in the last ten years).
86.
See, e.g., United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 774 (E.D. Mo. 1994), rev’d, 34 F.3d
709 (8th Cir. 1994) (refusing to sentence a drug offender in accordance with the sentencing
guidelines on grounds that the guidelines were motivated by “unconscious racism” and thus
violated the Equal Protection Clause).
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necessarily reference the practical and symbolic obstacles that have accrued
to accountability-reinforcing sanctions over the course of American history.
Understanding this history and the slow eclipse of broader accountabilityrelated concerns is a prerequisite to a fuller explanation, and it is to this
that I now turn.

II.

THE SECRET HISTORY OF ACCOUNTABILITY

Things look bleak for the American criminal justice system. Housing
87
one out of every four prisoners on the planet, draining state budgets of
funds desperately needed for education, housing, and healthcare,88 and with
89
some of the highest recidivism rates in history, it’s fair to say that we’ve
reached a dead end. Bizarrely, we spend tens of billions of dollars keeping
young men from our most impoverished communities idle,90 asking nothing
of them for their dependants, their communities, often not even for their
victims.
It wasn’t always so.91 In particular, colonial American sanctions and
the early penitentiary shared a concern for the social obligations of
offenders. They endeavored to use the power of the state not only to inflict
hardship, but also to force offenders back into responsible forms of behavior.
But the route to mass imprisonment reveals not just an enduring preference
for accountability, but also a lineage of embarrassing ancestors that have
given a bad name to both socially constructive sanctions and the use of
state power to coerce productivity. From brutally exploitative convict
leasing to exceptionally impolitic rehabilitative programs, succeeding
generations of reformers created a series of crises over the social meaning of
87.
See Dan Gardner, Bars and Stripes, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Mar. 16, 2002, at __.
88.
See Market Call: Tough Call: Should States Offer Criminals Early Release to Save Money?
(CNNFN television broadcast Nov. 17, 2003).
89.
See PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 193427,
SPECIAL REPORT: RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994, at 1 (2002) (“Among nearly
300,000 prisoners released in 15 States in 1994, 67.5% were rearrested within 3 years.”).
90.
The United States spends an estimated sixty billion dollars annually on corrections,
with costs rising steadily each year. See Peter Slevin, Prison Experts See Opportunity for
Improvement, WASH. POST, July 26, 2005, at A3.
91.
I begin with the work of historians of American law, but evidence of accountabilityreinforcing sanctions can be found in descriptions of punishment in many societies. See, e.g.,
KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW
IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE 135 (1941) (noting that much of Cheyenne law was intended to
instill in the individual a commitment to “fulfilling his obligations with greater consideration”);
WILLIAM IAN MILLER, BLOODTAKING AND PEACEMAKING: FEUD, LAW, AND SOCIETY IN SAGA
ICELAND 184 (1990) (arguing that “[t]he balanced-exchange model, to give it a name, served as a
kind of constitutive metaphor”).
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criminal sanctions. But as reformers sought to rid punishment of what they
viewed as its undesirable or ideologically offensive attributes, they also
inadvertently pared away the accountability-reinforcing aspects of earlier
sanctions. The brutal and unpopular company that accountability has kept
helps to explain why it now plays a relatively covert role in American
punishment.
A. A Colonial Contrast
In colonial America, many formal and informal sanctions focused
attention on the claims that others in the community had on the offender.92
The most typical forms of punishment were fines, the posting of bond, and
sureties,93 with shaming,94 corporal punishment, banishment, and the death

92.
While I will make some general claims about colonial law (none of which are
particularly novel), I take the issue of historical specificity and diversity to heart. As Douglas
Greenberg has noted:
Any discussion of crime and criminal justice in early American society must begin by
recognizing the distinctions among the various colonies. There were substantial
differences in their social arrangements, populations, ideologies, institutional
developments, and economic organization. Moreover, sometimes such variations could
be as profound within a single colony as they were among all of them. Indeed, it is
probably inaccurate to speak of colonial society at all; we would do better to understand
the experience of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Americans as having taken place
in a congeries of societies that shared the umbrella of the British Empire and little else.
Any generalization at all about these societies—to say nothing of a generalization about
so delicately influenced and locally colored a question as crime and law enforcement—is
almost inevitably subject to challenge and exceptions.
Douglas Greenberg, Crime, Law Enforcement, and Social Control in Colonial America, 26 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 293, 296 (1982). This diversity, however, supports, rather than undermines, one of
my claims: that our colonial forebears, as a whole, had a greater array of sanctions available to
them than do most American jurisdictions today.
93.
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 38–
39 (1993). A common combination of both formal and informal sanction was the assessing of
bonds of surety for good behavior against the properties of the defendant and two members of the
community willing to speak on the defendant’s behalf. These bonds or sureties, which friends
pledged to pay if the offender did not maintain his good behavior, helped draw the community
into the policing of the offender. See AM. HISTORICAL ASS’N, AMERICAN LEGAL RECORDS:
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA, at ix, lxxi (Peter Charles Hoffer & William B.
Scott eds., 1984). (“Fines were regularly imposed upon moral offenders to curb disorderliness,
drunkenness, swearing, and fornication.
Bonds for good behavior were . . . routinely
assessed . . . . The two sureties required from neighbors, friends, or superiors to pressure the
defendant to keep his pledge show that in deterrence, as in arrest and trial, the criminal justice
system of the county depended upon the active assistance of the community.”). In many areas
these sanctions accounted for more than all the other punishments combined. Id. at lxxi.
94.
See Kahan, supra note 54, at 630–49 (describing the use of shame sanctions);
Developments in the Law—Alternatives to Incarceration, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1863, 1872–75 (1998)
(same).
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penalty also employed, though less frequently.95 Combinations of these
punishments were common and, as Lawrence Friedman puts it, “rubbing the
noses of offenders in community context [was] an essential part of the
process.”96
Rather than reducing the social contributions of offenders, most early
American sanctions sought to increase them. Reminding offenders of and
requiring them to meet their responsibilities was achieved through a variety
of sanctions that relied heavily on social control rather than expensive
physical infrastructure. For example, a man convicted of stealing a hog in
colonial Maryland was ordered both to “make restitution for the slaughtered
animal . . . [and] to see that the county bridge was repaired before the next
meeting of the court.”97 And when Jane Lynch was convicted of stealing in
Philadelphia in 1760, she was ordered “whipt on Wednesday next at the
Carts tail round four Squares of the City,”98 fined, ordered to make
restitution, and required to post bond “for her good Behaviour for twelve
months.”99
Imprisonment was exceedingly rare. Where it was employed, it was
generally detention for other legal purposes,100 and when employed as a
sanction it was usually accompanied by other more common measures.
When, for example, Charles Sheepey was convicted of rape in 1687 in
West New Jersey, he was sentenced to be whipped for an hour in an open
cart while driven through town, and then held “in Irons for the Space of

95.
See ALICE MORSE EARLE, CURIOUS PUNISHMENTS OF BYGONE DAYS 72–75 (Chicago,
Herbert S. Stone & Co. 1896) (describing corporal punishments in the colonial era).
96.
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 93, at 48.
97.
Greenberg, supra note 92, at 303. As Greenberg notes, the forced labor was related to
the high value placed on labor, particularly in the Mid-Atlantic colonies of Maryland and
Virginia. Id.; see also RAPHAEL SEMMES, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN EARLY MARYLAND 67
(Patterson Smith Publ’g Corp. 1970) (1938) (describing the same incident).
98.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 93, at 38–39 n.35 (citing Mayor’s Court of Philadelphia, Jan.
Sess. (1760), microformed on American Trial Court Records Series, Ser. 1 (Temple University
School of Law)).
99.
Id.
100.
See DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND
DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 48 (1971). Rothman writes:
When crimes did occur, colonial towns, like their counterparts in England, meted out a
wide range of punishments. The most popular sanctions included fines, whippings,
mechanisms of shame (the stock and public cage), banishment, and of course, the
gallows. What was not on the list was imprisonment. The local jails held men (and it
was almost always men) going through the process of judgment, that is, those awaiting
trial or convicted but not yet punished, or men who were in debt without having
satisfied their obligations.
Id.
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three Moneths,”101 during which he would be whipped three more times and
would have to work for his keep.102
European-style “houses of correction” and “workhouses,” which held
offenders of many types, were more common than jail or prison—and these,
too, focused the state’s power on forcing offenders into responsible action.103
In New Hampshire, for example, the workhouse was constructed for the
“Keeping, Correcting and setting to Work of Rogues, Vagabonds, and
common Beggars, and other Lewd, Idle and Disorderly Persons,” as well as
those who “neglect their Callings, Mispend what they earn, and do not
provide for themselves, or the support of their Families.”104 Those
sentenced to lodge in these houses were expected to “provide themselves
Bedding food, and other Ne[ce]ssarys.”105 Indeed, in many workhouses, as in
some debtors’ prisons, inmates were expected to leave the premises during
the day to earn their keep and make good on their obligations to others.106

101.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 93, at 48 n.90 (citing H. CLAY REED & GEORGE J. MILLER, THE
BURLINGTON COURT BOOK: A RECORD OF QUAKER JURISPRUDENCE IN WEST NEW JERSEY,
1680–1705, at 79–80 (1944).
102.
Id.
103.
See PIETER SPIERENBURG, THE PRISON EXPERIENCE: DISCIPLINARY INSTITUTIONS
AND THEIR INMATES IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE (1991) (noting that the prison workhouse had
been established by the mid-sixteenth century in Europe and became commonplace by the midseventeenth century); see also Pieter Spierenburg, The Body and the State, in THE OXFORD
HISTORY OF THE PRISON 49, 64 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995) (noting that it
was the “obligation to work [that] distinguished prisons from almshouses, asylums, and hospitals,
as well as from workhouses, whose inmates worked voluntarily and not as punishment”).
104.
Act of May 14, 1718, ch. 15, 2 N.H. Laws 266, 266 (repealed 1792), reprinted in LAWS
OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 266 (Albert Stillman Batchellor ed., 1913); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note
93, at 49 (describing workhouses as “halfway between a poorhouse and a jail”). Seán McConville
has noted that in Europe as well, the “vagabond was . . . deemed to be a particularly dangerous
threat to social harmony and stability” mostly because he “could but would not work.” Seán
McConville, Local Justice: The Jail, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON, supra note 103, at
297, 313. Here, again, the notion of labor is not merely retributive, but takes on distinct
meanings in different contexts:
Henry VIII and his successors—notably Elizabeth I—brought in various remedial and
conservative laws. In essence these provided upkeep for the deserving poor, work for
those who were unemployed, and punishment for those who could but would not work.
The house of correction and the poorhouse thus rapidly became rivals of the jail.
Id. While criminalizing willful unemployment would be unacceptable today, it is important to
note that work can take on different meanings depending on whether it is voluntary or not.
Indeed, early modern European policies bear striking similarities to contemporary welfare policies,
except that criminal offenders are not required to work whereas noncriminals are.
105.
The Great Law Or the Body of Laws of the Province of Pennsilvania and territorys
thereunto Belonging past at an Assembly at Chester alias Upland the 7th day of the 10th Month
December 1682, reprinted in 1 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE TIME OF
WILLIAM PENN, 1680–1700, at 128 (Gail McKnight Beckman ed., 1976).
106.
See SPIERENBURG, supra note 103, at 141–42.
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These brief descriptions simply illustrate what extensive accounts of
the period describe in great and vivid detail: At our nation’s birth, fines,
bonds, sureties, mandatory labor, shaming, and corporal punishment were
preferred; imprisonment was rare and, in and of itself, generally considered
inappropriate as a punishment.107 In almost every case, the colonial
offender was not only expected to suffer pain or discomfort, but to labor
alongside other community members, putting his hand to the “common
weal.”108 “[T]o force inmates to labor,”109 to make good on their debts, and
to publicly apologize for their wrongs struck early Americans as not only
pragmatic, but just. On the other hand, to hold an able-bodied individual
idle at community expense, to demand nothing in the way of (indeed to
inhibit) responsible behavior, would have been considered not merely
costly or inefficient, but morally wrong—a compounding of the injustice
already wrought by the offender.110
B.

Original Meanings: Incarceration and Early American Penal Reform

The shift from colonial to postcolonial status was accompanied by a
philosophical shift that changed the meanings of corporal punishment and
incarceration. This shift led to reform of the criminal justice system and
the rapid rise of imprisonment to preeminence over the diverse array of
early American sanctions.
The first generation of American statesmen, as David Rothman has
described, rejected not only the political framework of their colonial
forbearers, but also the content and consequences of their criminal codes.111
To many early reformers, colonial methods of corporal punishment
threatened the public with a brutality unbefitting this more enlightened
107.
What made imprisonment severe was poverty: Those who were imprisoned were
expected to supply their own food and clothing, rely on the kindness of others, or perish.
108.
This sensibility is captured in the criminal sanctions proposed by Jefferson in his Notes
on the State of Virginia which emphasized “[f]orfeiture of lands and goods” to the Commonwealth
and mandatory “labour . . . for the public.” THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF
VIRGINIA 271 (J.W. Randolph 1853) (1787).
109.
ROTHMAN, supra note 100, at 25.
110.
See GEORG RUSCHE & OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE
50 (Russell & Russell 1968) (1939) (“Confinement without labor would be no punishment, and
the first requirement therefore, is to force the inmates to work under strict discipline. If the
government finds itself financially unable to carry out a particular branch of production, the
prisoners should be put to work on less expensive material.”).
111.
See ROTHMAN, supra note 100, at 59 (“Armed with patriotic fervor, sharing a
repugnance for things British and a new familiarity with and faith in Enlightenment doctrines,
they posited that the origins and persistence of deviant behavior would be found in the nature of
the colonial criminal codes.”).
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nation.112 Enlightenment theories of criminal sanctions gained ground; by
the end of the eighteenth century, reformers like William Bradford113 and
114
115
Thomas Eddy were drawing on the works of Montesquieu and
116
Beccaria to argue for a reform of punishments in line with principles of
117
deterrence, proportionality, and the least necessary punishment.
Repulsed by the draconian punishments imposed (or attempted) under
British colonial rule, and inspired by theories of the perfectibility of man,118
reformers reconceived imprisonment. Rather than offensive enforced
112.
For example, the Constitution of Pennsylvania of 1776 provided that “[t]he penal
laws . . . shall be reformed . . . and punishments made in some cases less sanguinary, and in general
more proportionate to the crime.” PA. CONST. of 1776, amend. VIII.
113.
Bradford served as Pennsylvania’s Attorney General from 1780–1791 and as the U.S.
Attorney General from 1794–1795. Between those posts, he authored an influential treatise
advocating the reform of criminal sanctions. See WILLIAM BRADFORD, AN ENQUIRY HOW FAR
THE PUNISHMENT OF DEATH IS NECESSARY IN PENNSYLVANIA (1793), reprinted in 12 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 122 (1968).
114.
See, e.g., THOMAS EDDY, AN ACCOUNT OF THE STATE PRISON OR PENITENTIARY
HOUSE, IN THE CITY OF NEW-YORK (1801) (drawing heavily on Beccaria and Montesquieu in his
arguments for reform). Eddy helped prepare the bill that established the Newgate prison, oversaw
the erection of the facility, and served as its first director. See generally SAMUEL L. KNAPP, THE
LIFE OF THOMAS EDDY (N.Y., Conner & Cooke 1834). The prison, opened in 1797 to high
hopes characteristic of the times, was generally regarded as a failure, and closed in 1828 after
numerous riots.
115.
Montesquieu’s The Spirit of Laws had been in translation for some time and was one of
the most frequently cited and influential texts at the time of the founding. See generally BARON
DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, BK. VI, at 101–36 (Thomas Nugent trans., 2d ed. 1752)
(1748) (describing “Consequences of the Principles of different Governments with respect to the
Simplicity of civil and criminal Laws, the Form of Judgments, and the inflicting of Punishments”).
116.
Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments (in translation in America by 1777) was a
favorite of the time. See GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON’S DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE 152 (Vintage 1979) (1978) (describing Beccaria as Jefferson’s “principal modern
authority for revising the laws of Virginia”).
117.
Bradford, for example, wrote:
The general principles upon which penal laws ought to be founded appear to be fully
settled. . . . Among these principles some have obtained the force of axioms, and are no
longer considered as the subjects either of doubt or demonstration. “That the prevention
of crimes is the sole end of punishment,” is one of these: and it is another, “That every
punishment which is not absolutely necessary for that purpose is a cruel and tyrannical act.” To
these may be added a third, (calculated to limit the first) which is, “That every penalty
should be proportioned to the offence.”
BRADFORD, supra note 113, at 126. Bradford goes on to review the history of Pennsylvania law
and describe the effects of various sentencing regimes on the behavior of both criminals and juries,
the latter of which often found guilty defendants innocent in “humane struggles . . . to save the
offender from death.” Id. at 141.
118.
In the competing models of the penitentiary, the young nation had arguably
transformed criminal sanctions into an Enlightenment-style experiment, a scientific application of
newly discovered human truths to the problems of the modern era. See generally MICHAEL
MERANZE, LABORATORIES OF VIRTUE: PUNISHMENT, REVOLUTION, AND AUTHORITY IN
PHILADELPHIA, 1760–1835 (1996) (describing the emergence of the penitentiary model).
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idleness, incarceration would allow for a concentrated dose of social
control: “Remove him from the family and community and place him in an
artificially created and therefore corruption-free environment. Here he
[can] learn all the vital lessons that others had ignored, while protected
from the temptations of vice.”119 Thus, the penitentiary was born.
Adopted first at the Auburn prison in New York and then in a rival
form in Philadelphia,120 the modern penitentiary was soon widely praised,
121
The sanction of the penitentiary was “publickly
studied, and imitated.
and disgracefully imposed,”122 and social control over the offender was then
reasserted through highly regimented days in which movement and activity
was organized to the last detail, and prisoners were (in theory) perfected
through long hours of silent labor, mass, and educational instruction.123
Although distinct in form from colonial sanctions in some aspects, the
early penitentiary was similar in that it sought to return the wayward
criminal to the ways of the virtuous citizen through the enforcement of
responsible behavior.124 Precisely because it repackaged social control in
what appeared to be a more modern, efficient, and humane design,
enthusiasm for the new system of convict reform was overwhelming.125
While southern and western states held out longer, most penal reformers in
119.
ROTHMAN, supra note 100, at 71.
120.
In Auburn, labor was “congregate,” with inmates working together. In Pennsylvania
the “separate” system prevailed, with inmates isolated from one another for the duration of their
sentence. While both models had their proponents, the Auburn model was more widely adopted.
See id. at 79–88.
121.
See id. at 88 (noting that the Auburn and Pennsylvania systems “became the blueprints
for constructing and arranging new prisons”).
122.
NEGLEY K. TEETERS & JOHN D. SHEARER, THE PRISON AT PHILADELPHIA: CHERRY
HILL: THE SEPARATE SYSTEM OF PENAL DISCIPLINE, 1829–1913, at 6 (1957) (citing Penn.
Mercury, Sept. 8, 1786, at 2); see also Stephen P. Garvey, Freeing Prisoners’ Labor, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 339, 342–53 (1998) (reviewing literature on labor in the early history of the penitentiary).
123.
Ironically, though, this eventually took the form of isolation from rather than
immersion in community life. Reformers wrote extensively of “the need to guard the criminal
against corruption and teach him the habits of order and regularity.” ROTHMAN, supra note 100,
at 83; see id. at 105 (noting that a “quasi-military”style of governance prevailed in the early
penitentiaries, with inmates moving literally in lock step from one activity to another).
124.
One prison chaplain was so taken with “the regularity, and temperance, and sobriety of
a good prison” that he felt that “society [should] change places with the prisoners . . . .” JAMES B.
FINLEY, MEMORIALS OF PRISON LIFE 41 (1851).
125.
As Finely wrote: “Could we all be put on prison fare, for the space of two or three
generations, the world would ultimately be the better for it.” Id.; see also ROTHMAN, supra note
100, at 83. The enthusiasm also had a fiscal aspect: Popular accounts described how it brought
the full force of societal obligations to bear in an almost scientifically controlled setting, all the
while saving the state a tidy sum. These accounts, coming from interested parties, are certainly
suspect. See, e.g., ROTHMAN, supra note 100, at 92–93; Garvey, supra note 122, at 353–56. But
even though the fiscal benefit was overstated, there was belief that the fiscal benefits from the
penitentiary added to its appeal—at least so long as fiscal benefit was plausible.
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America never “questioned the shared premise . . . that incarceration was
the only proper social response to criminal behavior.”126
C.

The Changing Meaning of Convict Labor

Early enthusiasm for the penitentiary quickly faltered, however, largely
as a result of a shift in the meaning of convict labor. Prison labor was the
centerpiece of the penitentiary model, the means by which responsibility
was enforced and reform effected. Over time, though, convict labor in both
the North and the South assumed new and highly contentious meanings.
In the North, free workers, particularly those attempting to organize
into unions, came to regard inmate labor as a threat to their livelihoods. In
response to widespread protests from both unions and trade groups, many
states enacted statutes or amended their constitutions to restrict the use of
prison labor.127 Faced with political opposition to the original, laborcentered model of the penitentiary, northern states shifted to what has been
described as the “custodial model”128 in its place, and the purpose of the
penitentiary came to be seen as isolation of the incorrigible rather than
129
The administration of
socialization through enforced responsibility.
justice was no longer imagined as exerting social control over offenders to
hold them accountable to broader social responsibilities, but rather as
containing unruly criminal crowds in large and underfunded facilities.130
The demise of the penitentiary model and the rise of the custodial model,
while widely lamented, was effectively accomplished in the North by the
turn of the century.131
126.
ROTHMAN, supra note 100, at 88.
127.
See MATTHEW J. MANCINI, ONE DIES, GET ANOTHER 15–16 (1996).
128.
See ROTHMAN, supra note 100, at 265–95.
129.
This theory of incarceration’s utility finds its modern counterpart in discussions of
incapacitation. As one prominent academic put it:
[W]e would view the correctional system as having [this] function—namely, to isolate
and to punish. . . . [S]ociety at a minimum must be able to protect itself from dangerous
offenders. . . . The purpose of isolating—or, more accurately, closely supervising—
offenders is obvious: Whatever they may do when they are released, they cannot harm
society while confined or closely supervised.
JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 172–73 (1975); see also John J. DiIulio, Jr., Instant
Replay: Three Strikes Was the Right Call, 18 AM. PROSPECT 12 (1994) (voicing a similar
conception of the criminal justice system’s proper function).
130.
See ROTHMAN, supra note 100, at 265 (“The first and most common element was
overcrowding and in its train came the breakdown of classification systems, the demise of work
therapy, and an increase in the use of mechanical restraints . . . .”).
131.
Southern states were slow to follow suit for numerous reasons. Urbanization and
industrialization came more slowly to southern states; the cultural climate was more amenable to
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While southern states were less enamored with penitentiaries and the
restorative capabilities of work,132 they had plenty of other uses for convicts,
and it is the southern experience that lends penal labor its most disturbing
associations today. Following the Civil War, many southern states adopted
convict leasing both as a substitution for slavery and as means of breaking
nascent unions across the southland.133 Southern penal labor was not a
system for enforcing responsible behavior, but one of brutal exploitation
134
and even extermination for private profit.
Despite unfavorable decisions by the Supreme Court in 1905 and
1914,135 convict leasing persisted at the state level into the 1920s and, at the
county level, convict leasing wouldn’t be fully quashed until well into the
Civil Rights era. When southern states finally relinquished the ability to
force inmates into private labor for profit, many simply transitioned to
forcing inmates into public labor on chain gangs, state farms, and prison
camps. Inmate abuses in these institutions were vicious, and the names of
many of the prisons farms and camps—Parchman, Angola, Sugarland,
Tucker, and Cummins—still conjure associations with brutal racial

the old community-oriented manner of punishment; and slavery gave violence a greater role in
the organization of discipline and punishment. Id.
132.
As a result, shaming punishments remained and, particularly for slaves and even free
blacks, corporal punishment was still deemed essential.
133.
See MANCINI, supra note 127 (describing the practice in Alabama, Arkansas, the
Carolinas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Texas).
134.
As one captain of a convict leasing camp in the Florida woods recounted, convicts
were assumed to be disposable: “There was no provision made for either shelter or
supplies. . . . [T]here was no food at all. . . . [C]onvicts were . . . only allowed the briefest intervals
from labor to scour the woods for food.” J.C. POWELL, THE AMERICAN SIBERIA, OR FOURTEEN
YEARS’ EXPERIENCE IN A SOUTHERN CONVICT CAMP 12 (Homewood 1893) (1891); see also
DAVID M. OSHINSKY, “WORSE THAN SLAVERY”: PARCHMAN FARM AND THE ORDEAL OF JIM
CROW JUSTICE (1996). Over half of all inmates on a specific project were literally worked to
death. Id. at 56. The brutality of the convict leasing system across the South is aptly captured in
the title of David M. Oshinsky’s recent account.
135.
In the Peonage Cases—Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905); Bailey v. Alabama,
219 U.S. 219 (1911); and United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914)—the U.S. Supreme
Court dealt convict leasing a major blow by invalidating laws that effectively maintained peonage
by criminalizing breach of employment contracts. Such laws were widespread in the South. See,
e.g., Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 25 (1944) (invalidating a Florida statute that criminalized
breach of contract); Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 29 (1942) (invalidating a Georgia statute
that criminalized breach of contract); Bailey, 219 U.S. at 245 (invalidating an Alabama statute
that criminalized breach of contract). Many states circumvented the Court’s intent by
criminalizing fraud instead of breach of contract. See Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and
Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era. Part 2: The Peonage Cases, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 646, 666, 689 (1982). But this did not by any means bar mandatory prison labor.
See, e.g., Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333 (1916) (upholding a Florida law requiring all ablebodied male citizens to work six days per year on public roads).
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violence and oppression.136 These, rather than any conception of offender
accountability, were ultimately the legacy of southern penal labor.
By the second half of the twentieth century, the meaning of penal
labor and the practice of imprisonment had been radically transformed. On
the one hand, both the northern and southern experience recast prison
industries as unfair competition for unions and manufacturers.137 At the
same time, southern chain gangs, prison farms, and other forms of penal
work lent convict labor another meaning—one synonymous with the legacy
of slavery and reconstruction. Progressives of that era could not help but
view prison labor through the dark glass of racial violence and exploitation.
While proponents of the earlier model of the productive prison never
fully disappeared, by the turn of the century they were awash in a sea of
disappointment and disgust. The emergence of reform movements across
the United States, although motivated by differing concerns at the local
level, eventually resulted in massive reductions in prison labor across the
board. In 1885, nine out of ten inmates in southern states were engaged in
some form of labor;138 the trend since that time has been a steady decline to
near extinction today.139
D.

The Changing Meaning of Penal Hardship and Rehabilitation

The concerns over exploitation and racial subordination that spurred
the dramatic curtailment of prison labor also led reformers to demand
improvement in prison conditions across the country. As the civil rights
136.
As Glenn Feldman has noted:
[T]he guns, whips, cattle prods, and dogs; the “trusties”—hardened convicts who served
as prison guards over the more generic “gunmen”; the harshness of labor on a cotton
plantation; the isolation, often unbearable heat, brutality, violence, sex, and drugs; an
array of medieval tortures applied by “trusties” without supervision; open ditches of raw
sewage, worm-ridden food, vermin-infested bedding, lost records; the indiscriminate
mixing of boys and men, girls and women, hardened criminals and minor offenders,
vagrants, or petty thieves; the curious incentive to “trusty” convicts to win pardons by
killing would-be escapees.
Glenn Feldman, Book Review, 83 J. AM. HIST. 1416, 1419 (1997) (reviewing ALEX LICHENSTEIN,
TWICE THE WORK OF FREE LABOR: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONVICT LABOR IN THE NEW
SOUTH (1996)); see also MANCINI, supra note 127; OSHINSKY, supra note 134 (describing
Oshinsky’s account of the Parchman farm).
137.
Given the open use of prison labor to break unions, the concern was not unfounded.
See Fletcher M. Green, Some Aspects of the Convict Lease System in the Southern States, in 31 ESSAYS
IN SOUTHERN HISTORY (1949) (describing these practices).
138.
GAIL S. FUNKE ET AL., ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OF CORRECTIONAL INDUSTRIES 20–
21 tbls.2–7 (1982).
139.
Fewer than one in sixteen inmates works today. Greg Wees, Prison Industries,
CORRECTIONS COMPENDIUM, June 1997, at 4.
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movement made headway in the courts, many civil rights activists were sent
to jail and prison. Their experiences raised awareness of a problem
unaddressed by the curtailment of prison labor: the endemic violence in
prisons, particularly against black inmates.140 In 1964, the Supreme Court
141
ruled in Cooper v. Pate that inmates have the right to bring legal action
against prison officials under the Civil Rights Act of 1871.142 It was after
this decision that federal involvement in the quality of incarceration began
in earnest. With a few dozen cases filed in 1964, a few hundred by 1966,
and tens of thousands by 1971, the floodgates of court-mandated reform
143
were opened.
Beginning in Arkansas,144 Mississippi, and a handful of other southern
states, the prison reform movement swept northward and westward. In the
name of today’s “broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized
standards, humanity, and decency,”145 courts have held that prisons and jails
must be hygienic; that the use of physical force by agents of the state must
be proportionate and necessary; and that severe forms of isolation are
subject to significant constitutional scrutiny.146
The resulting transformation of correctional facilities in state after
state has been dramatic. Although cruelty and hardship have not been
140.
See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE
MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 136 (1998) (describing the
systematic beatings of inmates that were the basis of important early prison litigation).
141.
378 U.S. 546 (1964).
142.
Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2000)); James B. Jacobs, The Prisoner’s Rights Movement and Its Impacts, in NEW PERSPECTIVES
ON PRISONS AND IMPRISONMENT 33, 36–37 (James B. Jacobs ed., 1983).
143.
By the late 1970s, at the request of the federal judiciary and other federal officials, most
state prisons had implemented some formal mechanism to address inmate complaints outside of
the courts. See, e.g., Donald P. Lay, Corrections and the Courts: A Plea for Understanding an
Implementation, RESOL. OF CORRECTIONAL PROBS. & ISSUES, Fall 1974, at 5, 10–11; REPORT OF
THE COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S.: GRIEVANCE MECHANISMS IN STATE CORRECTIONAL
INSTITUTIONS AND LARGE-CITY JAILS (1977).
144.
See Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965); see also FEELEY & RUBIN
supra note 140, at 55–73 (describing Judge Henley’s long crusade to reform Arkansas prisons and
the implications of federal involvement in state corrections).
145.
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
102 (1976)).
146.
A passage from the Court’s 1978 decision in Hutto v. Finney gives some indication of
the tenor of American penal reform during this period:
The Eighth Amendment’s ban on inflicting cruel and unusual punishments, made
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, “[proscribes] more than
physically barbarous punishments.”
It prohibits penalties that are grossly
disproportionate to the offense, as well as those that transgress today’s “broad and
idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.”
Id. at 685 (citations omitted).
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banished from prison,147 and many prisons today remain under court order
for Eighth Amendment, civil rights, and statutory violations,148 it is fair to
say that in large part prison reformers won at least one battle: Prisons are far
more humane today than they were in the first half of the twentieth
century.149
But reformers lost another battle: that over rehabilitation. While the
mission of offender rehabilitation had been in slow decline since the demise
of the original penitentiary system, it witnessed a temporary revival in the
1950s and 1960s. In this era, the same forces that united against cruel and
discriminatory punishment also pushed for a number of programs to help
criminal offenders become productive members of society. For this brief
period, an increased number (though certainly not a majority) of offenders
were offered a host of educational and job-training programs, often outside
of the prison setting.
Although these reforms may have shared the penitentiary’s goal of
bringing criminal offenders back into the social fold as productive and
virtuous citizens, the penal regime in which these programs were offered
was quite different from the early penitentiary. Progressive criminology
predominated, suggesting that criminality was driven by material hardship
and social marginalization—problems that involvement in the criminal
justice system only exacerbated.150 Whereas reform of offenders had once
147.
See, e.g., Pamela Podger, Ex-Warden Takes Fifth in Prison Abuse Probe; Lawmakers Grill
Corcoran Officials, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 19, 1998, at A19 (describing “violence, excessive force and
gladiator-style fights among inmates arranged by Corcoran [prison] guards”).
148.
The number has dropped, though, since the passage of the Prison Litigation Reform
Act of 1995, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2000). See, e.g., John Sullivan, States and Cities Removing Prisons
From Courts’ Grip, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2000, at 1.
149.
See Edgardo Rotman, The Failure of Reform, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON
169, 196 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995) (“The introduction of law and the
courts into prisons in the early 1960s contrasts with the lawlessness, arbitrariness, and cruelty that
had been routine in penitentiary management practice.”). There was, of course, an element of
popular constitutionalism in this litigation. See Neal Devins, I Love You, Big Brother, 87 CAL. L.
REV. 1283, 1285 (1999) (reviewing FEELY & RUBIN, supra note 140) (arguing that the prison
reform effort has been a “testament to how courts and elected officials participate in constitutional
dialogues with each other”). A description of reform in Arkansas gives some sense of the dramatic
transformation that has taken place:
Inmates no longer had to bribe brutal inmate overlords to obtain basic necessities. They
no longer had to fear for their lives every time they went to sleep. They no longer were
capriciously deprived of food and medical services. They no longer had to worry that
their genitals might be taped to electrodes or their knuckles cracked with pliers. They
were no longer stripped to the waist and whipped for failure to pick a sufficient amount
of cotton or okra.
FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 140, at 79.
150.
See, e.g., MENNINGER, supra note 56; WOOTTON, supra note 56; Menninger, supra
note 56; Wasserstrom, supra note 56; see also GARLAND, supra note 56.
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been attempted either through meticulous control over the offender or
through imposition of such misery as would deter future criminal conduct,
new notions of prisoner reform emphasized positive self-image, freedom,
capability, and moral choice.151 Particularly in the Northeast, correctional
institutions experimented with a host of educational, job training, and
other prisoner-empowerment programs.152 Many of these programs were
153
combined with the growth of parole, allowing offenders to receive job
training or guaranteed jobs in the community as part of an effort to
reintegrate the least advantaged back into society.154
But reformers quickly lost the battle over rehabilitation. In retrospect,
it is not hard to see why these programs were short-lived.155 Aside from the
fact that they generally had little or no measurable impact on rising rates of
crime and recidivism, the public simply viewed prisoner empowerment as
expressing too little condemnation of criminality.156 Complaints about the
lenity of the criminal justice system abounded, and public polling at the
time showed strong support for stricter police enforcement and tougher
penalties.157
By the late 1960s, the rehabilitative ideal was in decline; today, many
have declared it dead.158 Most of the rehabilitative programming that
151.
See Rotman, supra note 149, at 189–91.
152.
See id. at 179–81 (noting reformers like Thomas Mott Osborne who sought to
democratize prisons by introducing the “inmate self-government” into the penitentiary); David
Garland, The Limits of the Sovereign State, 36 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 445, 462 (1996) (describing
this form of penality as producing offenders “trained for freedom”).
153.
See JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE: PAROLE AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF
THE UNDERCLASS, 1890–1990 (1993) (describing the growth of parole); A. Keith Bottomley,
Parole in Transition: A Comparative Study of Origins, Developments, and Prospects for the 1990s, in 12
CRIME & JUST. 319, 321–26 (same); Joan Petersilia, Parole and Prisoner Reentry in the United States,
26 CRIME & JUST. 479, 484–85 (1999) (same).
154.
James Jacobs provides the classic account of the changes that transformed prison life
during this period by reviewing prison life at the Stateville Penitentiary in Illinois. JAMES B.
JACOBS, STATEVILLE: THE PENITENTIARY IN MASS SOCIETY (1977).
155.
Some had the foresight to see it at the time. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing
Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent Proposals for “Fixed” and “Presumptive”
Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550, 557–58 (1978).
156.
Cf. Kahan, supra note 54, at 626 (describing a similar problem with community
service).
157.
See, e.g., Monica D. Blumenthal et al., Justifying Violence: Attitudes of American Men,
ICPSR No. 3504 (2d ed. 1978), available at http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSRSTUDY/03504.xml; Roper Poll, Public Opinion Online, Nov. 1971 (showing that men favor get
tough measures to rehabilitation by 12 to 1); Gallup Poll (reporting that Americans, black and
white, are increasingly concerned over crime and lawlessness).
158.
The death of rehabilitation is, of course, still a matter of debate. Compare Charles H.
Logan & Gerald G. Gaes, Meta-Analysis and the Rehabilitation of Punishment, 10 JUST. Q. 245
(arguing for a purely custodial or “confinement” model of corrections) with D.A. Andrews et al.,
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survives remains tied to the unpopular prisoner rights and empowerment
model. Unlike mandatory programs in the early penitentiary system,
participation is usually optional; indeed, in many prisons, education, drug
treatment, job training, and work are privileges for which prisoners must
seek approval. Like “good time,”159 participation in rehabilitation programs
is conceived of as an optional benefit conferred upon offenders rather than
an obligation that offenders owe their victims, families, communities, or
society at large.
By remolding sanctions that forced offenders to meet prosocial
obligations into programs that focused on the therapeutic benefits accruing
to offenders, reformers effectively removed many of the core concerns of
accountability from mainstream penal practice. Most of the activities that
were once central to punishment—public apology, compensating victims,
labor for the common good, participation in basic educational programs,
and other responsible behaviors—have been captured by reforms with far
narrower social appeal, purified for progressive consumption, and thus
rendered politically inert.
E.

The Rise of Incarceration

We have come a long way from our colonial past. Prison conditions
and correctional practices are much improved. But if our sanctions are
gentler today, they are also less pragmatic. Far from “rubbing the noses of
offenders” in the community context, the vast majority of criminals are
removed from their neighborhoods, often to distant out-of-state prisons. At
immense cost to their victims, their families, their communities, and the
state, they sit idle. It is an arrangement that distresses those on both the
left and the right,160 and is a systematic enforcement of unaccountability
and dependence that is not only expensive, but which frustrates the public’s
moral intuitions about what just sanctions entail.
There is also something perverse about the continued growth of prison
populations that has accompanied the steady improvement of prison life.
Even those who supported and participated in the reforms of the 1960s look
back on their efforts with mixed feelings. Some of the staunchest defenders
Does Correctional Treatment Work? A Clinically Relevant and Psychologically Informed Meta-Analysis,
28 CRIMINOLOGY 369 (1990) (arguing for rehabilitative service for higher risk convicts).
159.
“Good time” is a reduction in the term of incarceration that a prisoner “earns” through
good behavior.
160.
See infra notes 225–240 and accompanying text (describing the widespread
dissatisfaction with incarceration).
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of judicial intervention today acknowledge that the “constitutionalization
of the process. . . . may have contributed to an increased willingness to rely
on prisons and even to the increasing oppressiveness that results from the
development of supermaximum institutions.”161 And a prominent prison
litigator concedes that “by promoting the comforting idea of the ‘lawful
prison,’ the litigation movement may have smoothed the way for ever162
harsher sentences and criminal policies.”
To be sure, there is much to grimace at in historical accounts of
American justice, and reformers can justifiably remark that they have made
the criminal justice system less barbarous. But I suggest that along the way
we have lost something besides cruelty, something important. Although we
rightly champion the humanity of two centuries of criminal justice
reform—a vast improvement over the brutality of early American
sanctions—we should also mourn the loss of the sense of social
accountability that earlier criminal sentences endeavored to attain.
Punishments that enhance offender accountability have been captured and
transformed by political reform movements that had less to do with
accountability per se than with the excesses of offender exploitation and
empowerment. Each capture and transformation has altered the socially
constructive forms of punishment to more narrowly approximate the
concerns of either punitiveness or rehabilitative idealism rather than
concerns about offender accountability. I now turn to these issues.

III.

ACCOUNTABILITY AND POPULAR PUNITIVENESS

Criminal offenders, it is often said, owe a debt to society. But
progressive reformers reversed this intuitive understanding by arguing that
society owed a debt to offenders. Far from denying them freedom and
holding them accountable, the rehabilitative ideal offered offenders the
kind of options that define freedom and, even more distressingly, the ability
to live free of their obligations to others. Conservatives did no better,
privileging punitiveness to the exclusion of public-regarding and sociallyconstructive features that punishment might also entail.
This, of course, is not the standard reading of our current predicament.
According to leading theorists, mass incarceration is a response to the
161.
FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 140, at 375.
162.
Margo Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge: Institutional Return Litigation as Litigation, 97
MICH. L. REV. 1994, 1998 n.19 (1999); see also Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second
Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 355 (1995) (describing a similar pattern in the recent history of capital punishment).
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public’s insatiable demand for “harsh justice,”163 “degradation,”164
“condemnation,”165 and a “robust retributivism.”166 Popular punitiveness is
167
the theory of the moment, explaining why—despite untenable budget
168
outlays, the devastation of vulnerable communities,169 and the nearly
170
unanimous opposition of experts —our prisons continue to expand beyond
all historical precedent.171
But the signs that Americans are pining for more meaningful sanctions
abound. Looking back across the first 150 years of our nation’s history, few
would have complained that our criminal justice system demanded too little
from criminal offenders. Over the last four decades, however, that feeling
has become commonplace.
The dissatisfaction is apparent in the

163.
JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE 3 (2003) (providing a comparative historical
account of American punitiveness).
164.
See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE
LAW 277 (2004) (linking degradation to “narcissistic aggression [that is] particularly acute in
today’s America”).
165.
Kahan, supra note 54, at 630–53 (arguing that punitiveness is intrinsic to punishment
and must thus be harnessed, for example, through shaming).
166.
TRAVIS, supra note 77, at xx (describing nonpunitive efforts as “tender seedlings
struggling for light in the dark forest of robust retributivism dominating our discourse on
sentencing policy”).
167.
See, e.g., DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER
IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 13–14 (2001); SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY
OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 222–24 (2d ed. 1998); Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the
Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1276, 1276 (2005) (“Voices in favor of tougher
sentences dominate the legislative debate at the state and federal levels.”); Anthony Bottoms, The
Philosophy and Politics of Punishment and Sentencing, in THE POLITICS OF SENTENCING REFORM 17,
39–41 (Chris Clarkson & Rod Morgan eds., 1995); Richard S. Frase, Comparative Perspectives on
Sentencing Policy and Research, in SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 259,
262–63 (Michael Tonry & Richard S. Frase eds., 2001); Franklin E. Zimring, Populism, Democratic
Government, and the Decline of Expert Authority: Some Reflections on “Three Strikes” in California, 28
PAC. L.J. 243 (1996).
168.
See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
169.
I develop these points in greater detail elsewhere. See generally BRAMAN, supra note 8;
Donald Braman, Families and Incarceration, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002);
Donald Braman & Jenifer Wood, From One Generation to the Next, in PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED
167 (Jeremy Travis & Michelle Waul eds., 2003).
170.
See Kahan, supra note 54, at 592 (describing expert opposition to mass incarceration
across the ideological spectrum).
171.
Bill Stuntz has developed another explanation, describing the politics of institutional
design and incentives that drive the expansion of the criminal codes. William J. Stuntz, The
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 510–11 (2001). His account is
complementary to that developed here: Precisely because the likelihood of shrinking the criminal
code is so small, the punishment goal of the criminal justice system is the logical place to look for
reform.
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resurgence of interest in early American sanctions,172 in several attempts to
increase criminal liability (including the victim compensation movement),
and in the profound dissatisfaction with prisoner idleness found in nearly
every state and national survey conducted on the issue.173 The public
174
And
overwhelmingly feels that criminal offenders get off too lightly.
when asked to evaluate various parts of the criminal justice system, the
public appears to be most dissatisfied with the quality of imprisonment.
Whether this dissatisfaction stems from a desire for greater
punitiveness or a desire for greater accountability matters a great deal. For
if the public desires more punitiveness, then progressive reformers who
favor more constructive sanctions will need to undertake the lengthy (and,
in all likelihood, impossible) task of reeducating the public about the
virtues of conferring rehabilitative benefits on offenders. But if my account
is correct, and it is accountability that the public wants, then it may make
more sense to help reformers develop socially constructive proposals that
more closely meet public demand. To that end, I now turn to a defense of
the public’s desire for accountability against the charge of popular
punitiveness.
A. The Puzzle of Popular Punitiveness
Standard accounts of the rise of incarceration and the resurgent
interest in archaic forms of punishment often refer to the emergence of a
“popular punitiveness” in America.175 According to this theory, the public
demands harsher and harsher penalties as an expression of its fear of crime
and its disgust with criminality.176 Theories of popular punitiveness suggest

172.
For an overview of this revival, see J.C. Oleson, Comment, The Punitive Coma, 90 CAL.
L. REV. 829, 836–43 (2002).
173.
For a balanced review of public opinion research on public attitudes, see Francis T.
Cullen et al., Public Opinion About Punishment and Corrections, 27 CRIME & JUST. 1 (2000).
174.
See infra Part III.B.2 for a detailed discussion of this data.
175.
This hypothesis has been widely discussed. See, e.g., GARLAND, supra note 167;
Bottoms, supra note 167; Frase, supra note 167; Zimring, supra note 167. But see Francis T. Cullen
et al., Explaining the Get Tough Movement: Can the Public Be Blamed?, 49 FED. PROBATION 16, 22
(1985) (arguing that the rehabilitative ideal is alive and well); Francis T. Cullen et al., Is
Rehabilitation Dead? The Myth of the Punitive Public, 16 J. CRIM. JUST. 303 (1988) (same); Francis
T. Cullen et al., Public Support for Correctional Treatment: The Tenacity of Rehabilitative Ideology, 17
CRIM. JUST. & BEH. 6, 7 (1990) (same); Sandra Evans Skovron et al., Prison Crowding: Public
Attitudes Toward Strategies of Population Control, 25 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 150, 154 (1988)
(same).
176.
See, e.g., KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS 3 (1997).
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that the public is “obsessed . . . with dangerous individuals.”177 Insisting on
a “zero-tolerance approach,”178 the public “believes that with severe enough
179
sanctions, crime can and should be completely eliminated.”
While commentators across the political spectrum generally agree on
the contours of popular punitiveness, they have strikingly different
responses to it. Conservative reformers see it as a natural reaction to
decades of liberal mismanagement of the criminal justice system, during
which progressives were able to use the courts to “expand[ ] the rights of
criminals with little if any . . . concern for consequences.”180
The
humanization of the criminal justice system at the hands of progressive
courts, conservatives argue, has diminished both the moral message and the
deterrent capacity of the criminal law.181 On this account, the public is
both righteous and pragmatic in its demand for longer prison terms.182
Liberal reformers, on the other hand, lament that the recent turn away
from the progressive humanization of our criminal justice system toward
lengthy prison sentences heralds neither moral nor pragmatic progress, but
183
an appalling “new primacy of vengeance seeking.” There are usually three
184
parts to liberal critiques of popular punitiveness: A sensationalist media
misleads the public by exaggerating both the risk of criminal victimization
and the leniency of the criminal justice system;185 savvy conservative
politicians play up criminal sanctions in elections, often using “tough on
crime” policies as a code for racial prejudice;186 and the public, primed by
177.
Jonathan Simon, Managing the Monstrous: Sex Offenders and the New Penology, 4
PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 452, 455 (1998).
178.
Id.
179.
Id.
180.
Arnold Beichman, Crime on the Campaign Scales, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1996, at
A14.
181.
See, e.g., James J. Foster, Letter to the Editor, Let’s Be Tougher on Inmates, MILWAUKEE
J. SENTINEL, Feb. 28, 1999, at 5 (“It’s simply wrong to say that lawmakers lack the courage to stop
making the criminal code harsher. What we lack is the courage to truly punish lawbreakers.
Instead, we provide a comfortable environment for inmates, including cable television, fitness
equipment and other creature comforts that many law-abiding citizens don’t have.”).
182.
Elliot Currie summarizes this perspective quite nicely: “Contrary to the claims of liberal
do-gooders and ‘elite’ experts, prison ‘works’; locking up more people for longer terms . . . cuts
crime dramatically, and indeed the reason crime has fallen in the past few years is that we have
finally begun to put more criminals behind bars.” ELLIOT CURRIE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA 4 (1998).
183.
Simon, supra note 177, at 455.
184.
Some parse these categories more finely. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on
Crime? Prospects for Restorative Justice in the United States, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 413, 423–24 (2003)
(describing five elements).
185.
See, e.g., Bottoms, supra note 167.
186.
See, e.g., Jonathan Simon, Doing Time: Punishment, Work Discipline and Industrial
Time, paper presentation at the ISA Conference, Amsterdam, 1991.
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cultural and psychological phenomena to be receptive to media coverage
and political overtures, gives free rein to its punitive impulses by demanding
ever harsher criminal penalties.187 The result over the last quarter century
has been, on this account, a “punitive turn in contemporary penality,”188
characterized by three-strikes and mandatory minimum sentencing laws, the
increased adoption of sentencing guidelines, the abolition or reduction in
the use of parole, truth-in-sentencing laws, and, of course, the subsequent
189
dramatic increase in prison populations.
While these accounts of popular punitiveness have some merit, they
are also unsatisfying in important ways and, ultimately, misleading. First,
they fail to explain why the public supports not only harsher punishments
but seemingly softer ones as well. Poll after poll show the same perplexing
pattern: The public wants the government to get much tougher on
criminals, but it also wants the government to educate, train, and employ
them.190 When progressive analysts try to explain the complexity of public
sentiment, most simply dismiss the public’s punitiveness as irrational and
191
immoral, while praising public interest in rehabilitation as reasoned and
beneficent.192 Conservatives, predictably, do the reverse.193
Second, traditional popular-punitiveness accounts fail to explain why
the massive expansion of the criminal justice system in recent history has
187.
See, e.g., Bottoms, supra note 167, at 47.
188.
Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through Modern
Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 831 n.5 (2000) (quoting David Garland, The Culture of High
Crime Societies: Some Preconditions of Recent “Law and Order” Policies, 40 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY
347, 349–50 (2000)).
189.
See BRAMAN, supra note 8, at 32 (describing the federal laws and incentives that
helped to produce these outcomes); see also GARLAND, supra note 167, at 142 (describing the
indicia of popular punitiveness as including “[h]arsher sentencing and the increased use of
imprisonment; ‘three strikes’ and mandatory minimum sentencing laws, ‘truth in sentencing’ and
parole release restrictions; no frills prisons laws and ‘austere prisons’; . . . the revival of chain gangs
and corporal punishment; boot camps and supermax prisons”).
190.
See infra Part III.B for a more detailed analysis.
191.
This approach lays much of the blame at the feet of what one prominent critic has
described as “mob politics.” James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong With Inflicting Shame Sanctions?,
107 YALE L.J. 1055, 1091 (1998). Whitman offers a reasoned response: If the force behind recent
changes are the “irrational urges of the public,” then it is the job of the enlightened academics to
urge resistance to such impulses. Id. The lament of academics extends to the general removal of
academics from the center of the criminal justice machine, in part because the public is perceived
to view academic debates as largely irrelevant to punishment. See, e.g., Zimring, supra note 167,
at 254 (“The public believes that analytic and statistical implications of policy choices in criminal
justice are unimportant.”).
192.
See, e.g., Melissa M. Moon et al., Is Child Saving Dead? Public Support for Juvenile
Rehabilitation, 46 CRIME & DELINQ. 38, 54–57 (2000).
193.
See, e.g., Charles Murray, The Ruthless Truth: Prison Works, TIMES (London), Jan. 12,
1997, at 2.
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not sated the public’s appetite. For the last forty years, a large proportion of
the public has complained that courts fail to treat offenders harshly
enough194 and that criminals get off with what the public views as
insufficient punishments.195 This is so despite an increase in incarceration
rates that is unmatched in our own history, and perhaps even in the history
of the world. If the criminal justice system is steadily becoming more
punitive, why is there no equivalent decline in public dissatisfaction?
Conservatives view public dissatisfaction as justifying more of the same.
Progressives, on the other hand, have developed a secondary set of
increasingly strained theories196 about why the contemporary public is
particularly ignorant and vicious.
Finally, while conservatives derive a clear political imperative from
their account of popular punitiveness, it is unclear what progressives derive
from theirs. Indeed, perhaps the biggest problem with the progressive
theories of popular punitiveness is not simply that they cannot explain what
is happening or why, but that they are not very useful in determining what
should be done. By locating the sources of popular punitiveness in broad
structural shifts in social and economic life, sophisticated political
manipulation, and widespread media practices, progressive theories of
popular punitiveness tend toward political inertia. By assuming the public
to be gullible, misinformed, and morally inept, progressive critiques of the
criminal justice system essentially disavow any political constituency they
might have.197
194.
See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1999, at 130–31 tbl.2.56 (Ann L. Pastore & Kathleen Maguire
eds., 2000).
195.
The evidence of a general perception of the lack of sufficient punishment is not limited
to statistical studies. See, e.g., Jean Johnson, Letter to the Editor, Prisoners Have It Easy, HERALDSUN (Durham, N.C.), Apr. 20, 1995, at A12. Johnson writes:
As a working, taxpaying citizen, I am shocked. [We’re] buying 12 32-inch TVs for
prisoners in the new jail. I work every day, live in a 45-year-old house and have a 19inch TV. It is inhuman for prisoners to be made to pick up litter. I work and help pick
up litter on the weekends—give the citizens a break. I suppose we will all have to rob
banks, shoot our neighbors or break into someone’s home. Then the county government
can support us, too.
Id.; Peter T. Kilborn, Revival of Chain Gangs Takes a Twist, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1997, at A18
(“Rehabilitation does not work, say people in Centreville. And prisoners have it too easy, they
add. A convict gets free room, board, medical care and television, while they have to earn both
their own keep and his. They want convicts, like welfare recipients, to work.”).
196.
See supra notes 185–187 and accompanying text.
197.
See Kahan, supra note 54, at 592. Kahan’s specific point is distinct from that made
here. He argues that sanctions that are not punitive have no political constituency. However, I
argue that accountability matters as well, and I share his skepticism of the political viability of
offender-empowering sanctions.

53:5

Braman 2

Braman Final Read

(5/2/2006 3:48 PM)

Punishment & Accountability

47

I suspect that part of the difficulty progressive analysts have had in
interpreting public sentiment may have to do with the anxiety with which
traditional liberal theories of justice regard popular sentiment.198 While
conservatives are more comfortable with populist moralizing, liberals tend
to distrust popular concerns. Just as liberal accounts of popular punitiveness
imply that the public is irrational and immoral, liberal theories of justice
often describe the law as guarding individuals against the undisciplined
impulses of the masses.199 But in this case the liberal aversion to developing
a more robust account of public sentiment is misplaced. While we should
protect suspects, defendants, and offenders from the mob,200 public
frustration with our criminal justice system is not simply a fearful lashing
out in the face of crime. A closer examination suggests that public
concerns reflect a deeper anxiety about the unraveling of the social fabric
itself, and the inability of our criminal justice system to do anything about
it. In this instance the public is right, and reformers would do well to pay
closer attention.
B.

Reexamining Public Sentiment

The skeptical reader might argue that popular punitiveness is
evidenced in the resurgence of interest in punitive early American
sanctions like shaming and chain gangs, or might point to public opinion
polls commonly cited as supporting the notion of popular punitiveness.
Before accepting any theory featuring accountability as motivating demand
for punishment, then, this reader will want some response to oft-quoted
evidence regarding popular punitiveness.

198.
See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 6 (1956) (echoing
Madison’s concern that one group will “tyrannize over others” if unchecked by the constraints of
liberalism); SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS 119–
30 (1981) (describing the threat of populist extremism); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
203 (rev. ed. 1999) (defending individual rights against popular sentiment “[w]hatever the depth
of feeling against them”).
199.
See Whitman, supra note 191, at 1091 (“In defining ourselves as a liberal society, as a
society different from Maoist or Nazi society, we must accordingly remain conscious of the dangers
of demagogic politics—conscious of the impropriety of any kind of official action that plays on the
irrational urges of the public.”).
200.
See id. at 1091 (arguing that it is “a condition of democratic rule of law, and of the
right of a democratic society to punish, that we shy away from mob politics”).
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Reinterpreting Interest in Early American Sanctions

Perhaps the most salient indicator of public dissatisfaction with
contemporary criminal sanctions is the resurgence of interest in archaic
alternatives. A number of reformers have argued, for example, that modern
201
shame sanctions and chain gangs should be more widely employed. This
renewed interest in alternatives and supplements to simple detention has
often been interpreted as evidence of popular punitiveness.202 As one
commentator described the development, “Cruelty and pain, long treated as
inappropriate ends of public policy, are steadily making inroads into the
discourse and practice of punishment.”203 These are, theorists of popular
punitiveness suggest, indicative of a broader “severity revolution”204 in
Americans’ conception of just punishment.
But while initially plausible, this interpretation becomes less
satisfactory on further inspection. If the public wants punitiveness, cruelty,
and pain, then why is it that the public is repulsed by calls for a return to
public executions,205 corporal punishment,206 and stocks207—suggestions that
208
Indeed, if it were really
to most Americans seem unacceptably harsh?
201.
See Kahan, supra note 54, at 632–37 (surveying shame sanctions imposed by judges);
Whitman, supra note 191, at 1057 (noting that “courts are ordering shame sanctions”); Mark
Curriden, Hard Time, A.B.A. J., July 1995, at 72, 74; Peter Morrison, The New Chain Gang, NAT’L
L.J., Aug. 21, 1995, at A1.
202.
See, e.g., Cullen et al., supra note 173, at 27 (reporting that “nearly four in five
Americans believe that the courts in their communities are not sufficiently punitive”).
203.
Jonathan Simon, Sanctioning Government: Explaining America’s Severity Revolution, 56
U. MIAMI L. REV. 217, 219 (2001).
204.
Id.
205.
Cf. AUSTIN SARAT, WHEN THE STATE KILLS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
AMERICAN CONDITION 30 (2001) (arguing that it is precisely because of this repulsion that we
should resist “the turning of state killing into an invisible, bureaucratic act” and make executions
public as part of a “new abolitionism”).
206.
Some argue that “[c]orporal punishment may appear to be a barbaric solution to the
problems of a civilized society, but it is in fact a reasonable, rational alternative to the systemic
prison overcrowding and rampant recidivism that are part of our current approach to crime and
criminals.” Whitney S. Weideman, Comment, Don’t Spare the Rod: A Proposed Return to Public,
Corporal Punishment of Convicts, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 651, 652 (1996). Others have argued that the
public actually supports public corporal punishment. See, e.g., Daniel E. Hall, When Caning Meets
the Eighth Amendment: Whipping Offenders in the United States, 4 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 403, 407–08
(1995). However, even corporal punishment advocates admit that public opinion polls show that
a majority oppose the practice. Id. at 408. Indeed, while there have been a number of calls for
public caning and a return to corporal punishment, despite their legality, the proposals have failed
to produce much in the way of results.
207.
For a fanciful rejection of the stocks, see Harrison Fletcher, We’ve Gotta Teach These
Kids a Lesson, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Jan. 18, 1996, at A3.
208.
See Kahan, supra note 54, at 591 (describing corporal punishment as “barely
conceivable”).

53:5

Braman 2

Braman Final Read

(5/2/2006 3:48 PM)

Punishment & Accountability

49

punitiveness on the rise, then one would expect the public to prefer these
over arguably less punitive early American sanctions.
An alternative account—one that features public desire for offender
accountability—fits the facts far better. For example, shaming, as Dan
Kahan and others note,209 is far less expensive than incarceration,210 arguably
no worse a deterrent,211 and gives expression to public disapprobation by
212
being explicitly retributive. I suggest that, for many Americans, the most
attractive aspect of shaming is the implicit social order that shame
sanctions advertise: the notion that the community is capable of imposing
its norms on criminal offenders in a highly visible manner. Shame
sanctions recall a form of community connectedness that many feel is
slipping away; indeed, many studies show that it is in fact slipping away.213
They remind us of communities that were well-ordered enough to impose
decidedly social sanctions.
Similarly, chain gangs combine publicity and sociality, but they also
add the dimension of enforced social productivity.214 Unsurprisingly, as our
society has drifted toward sanctions that are increasingly asocial—
effectively requiring offenders to do nothing and to serve no one—opinion
polls show chain gangs gaining the support of a substantial majority of the
population in many states.215 The public in these states appears eager to
209.
See generally id.; Whitman, supra note 191.
210.
Kahan, supra note 54, at 641.
211.
Id. at 638–41.
212.
Id. at 645–36.
213.
See, e.g., PUTNAM, supra note 75 (describing the decline in social connectedness in the
United States).
214.
I discuss the public opinion data on this below. See infra Part III.B.2.
215.
See Rhonda Cook, Chain Gangs Seen as Fair by Georgians, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb.
14, 1996, at A1 (reporting a public opinion poll finding that “support for chain gangs crossed
political, racial, generational and economic lines”); Mario Garcia, Editorial, Letters From the
People, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 26, 1996, at 6B (stating that in Illinois “polls estimate
public support for chain gangs to be between 70 percent and 90 percent”); Betsy Z. Russell,
Punishing Costs—More Chain Gangs, Long Sentences; But No More Prisons, IDAHO FALLS POST
REG., Nov. 16, 1997, at A1 (“Seventy-five percent [of Idahoans] support chain gangs assigned to
do community tasks outside prison walls.”); Kimberly Seitz, Reviving Chain Gangs A Good Idea, S.
BEND TRIB., Mar. 10, 1996, at A21 (reporting that “more than 70 percent of the people of
Alabama support Gov. Fob James’ decision to reimplement chain gangs”); Bruce Merrill & Lacey
Phelps, Press Release, KAET Poll: Overwhelming Support For Chain Gangs (May 25, 1995), available
at http://www.kaet.asu.edu/horizon/poll/1995/maypoll2.htm (noting that 75 percent of registered
voters in Arizona support the use of chain gangs and that support crossed party and ideological
lines); Kelly Pearce, Chain Gang Proposal Survives First Test in Senate (May 3, 1996), available at
http://www.prisonactivist.org/pipermail/prisonact-list/1996-May/000310.html (reporting that 71
percent of Coloradans favor the use of chain gangs); Florida Dep’t of Corrections, Inmate Work
and Unstructured Time (1998), available at http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/survey/work.html
(reporting that nearly three-quarters (73.3 percent) of Floridians support the use of chain gangs).
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reintroduce explicit social obligations into the criminal justice system, and
it views chain gangs as a way of achieving just that.
Reframed in terms of accountability, shame sanctions and chain gangs
can be seen as a piece of one of the most unexpected reforms in recent
American penology: the return of the religious penitentiary. State after
state is opening faith-based correctional facilities or programs in which
inmates are required not only to work, but to “attend classes, . . . learn how
to dress for a job, communicate better with their families[, and] cope with
adversity,”216 all in the context of religious penitence and devotion. This is
occurring in states that are considered to be among some of the most
conservative217 and the most progressive.218 It’s clearly not punitiveness that
moves the public to advocate for these programs. Rather, those who
support the return of the religious penitentiary are looking for ways to bring
criminal offenders into the social fold. They view religion not only as a
good in and of itself, but also as a means to that end.219 The reintroduction
of government-approved faith-based correctional facilities, in fact, forgoes
many of the punitive parts of the early American penitentiary, while
expanding on its accountability-reinforcing features.220
An account that features public interest in greater offender
accountability also helps to explain what has been by far the most popular
reform in criminal sanctions in the past half century: the return of

216.
“Most of Lawtey’s inmates, like those in other Florida prisons, spend their mornings at
menial jobs inside the prison or on work-release programs. The difference begins in the afternoon,
when church volunteers teach all inmates such secular skills as how to write a résumé, open a
bank account and manage a household budget.” Alan Cooperman, An Infusion of Religious Funds
in Fla. Prisons: Church Outreach Seeks to Rehabilitate Inmates, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 2004, at A1.
217.
See, e.g., Carlos Campos, Faith Behind Bars, 4C ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug 22, 2004, at
C4 (describing faith-based prison programs in Georgia); Gary Emerling, Inmate Aid Project Grows,
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2005, at A10 (describing faith-based prison programs in Texas); Prison
Will Be Model for Country, TAMPA TRIB., Apr. 26, 2004, at 10 (describing faith-based prison
programs in Florida).
218.
In Brief, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2004, at B7 (describing faith-based prison programs in
Maryland); Steve Silverman, Center Lends Aid, Strength to Parolees, PANTAGRAPH (Bloomington,
Ill.), Mar. 10, 2003, at A4 (describing faith-based prison programs in Illinois); Ron Word, Christ
Behind Bars, TELEGRAPH HERALD, May 22, 2004, at D1 (describing faith-based prison programs in
Iowa).
219.
See, e.g., Lawrence Aaron, Faith-based Solution to Combat Recidivism, RECORD (Bergen
County, N.J.), July 28, 2004, at L09.
220.
See, e.g., Gussie Fauntleroy, Penitentiary’s Early Years Were Full of Politics, SANTA FE
NEW MEXICAN, June 13, 1999, at F1 (describing an early penitentiary in New Mexico in which
inmates were given “good clothing, proper literature, and systematic religious exercises”); Jean
Gordon, The Bible Behind Bars, NEWS-STAR, Feb. 5, 2003, at A1 (describing the religious roots of
the penitentiary in which every inmate was “‘given a Bible and told to repent’” (quoting Marianne
Fisher-Giorlando)).
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restitution and victim compensation221 to the criminal justice system.
Restitution (where offenders directly repay victims) and victim
compensation (where the state collects fines from offenders and provides
assistance to victims based on need) were once integral to the sanctions
imposed on criminal offenders. But both were steadily removed from the
criminal code as civil and criminal cases became formally distinguished
from one another and victims were required to pursue compensation in the
civil system. It was not until quite recently, with the rise of the victims’
rights movement, that the federal government and most states established
victim compensation programs,222 and many reintroduced restitution.223
And while providing assistance to victims has obvious political appeal on
its own, there is a deeper appeal to America’s sense of justice in demanding
that criminal offenders pay for that compensation—a justice that is better
expressed in terms of accountability than punitiveness.
My point here is not that we should evaluate these sanctions only in
terms of accountability, nor that any of these programs are—when
considered in full—desirable; rather I believe that their popular appeal can
help us to understand how the public thinks about sanctions in more
productive and sophisticated ways than standard accounts that simply pit
rehabilitation against retribution and deterrence. Viewed across the scope
of American history, it is not hard to understand why, when Americans
look back on early American criminal sanctions, their discomfort is often
mixed with a heavy dose of longing.224 Criminal offenders today are held
unaccountable to everyone that matters—their victims, their children,
their communities, and society at large—and the public is understandably
upset. Indeed, it is hard to think of a form of punishment that asks less of

221.
A number of people have noted the extraordinary success of the victim compensation
movement. For an early description of the rationale behind the movement, see Stephen Shafer,
Victim Compensation and Responsibility, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 55 (1970). For a more recent
recapitulation of the history of the movement, see Christopher Bright, Victim Compensation
Funds (1997), http://www.restorativejustice.org/intro/tutorial/outcomes/compensation (reviewing
the history of victim compensation funds). For a review of the historical origins of victim
compensation, see Shafer, supra, at 55–57.
222.
See Bright, supra note 221 (noting that “[s]tate action began with California in 1965
when it set up its first compensation program” with various other states following suit until,
finally, “in 1984, Congress passed a bill to finance state compensation programs”).
223.
Restitution differs from compensation in that the money is paid directly to the victim
by the offender. For a review of restitution law, see Note, Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process:
A Procedural Analysis, 97 HARV. L. REV. 931 (1984).
224.
For a less favorable account of this phenomenon, see Simon, supra note 177 (describing
the revival as a form of postmodern nostalgia).
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the offender or expresses less social anguish over the abandonment of social
responsibilities than the human warehousing we regularly impose.
2.

Reinterpreting Public Opinion Data

Accountability can also provide us with a more satisfying account of
public opinion data. Over the last decade, dozens of national and statewide
surveys have been conducted to gauge the public attitudes about crime,
criminal offenders, and the criminal justice system. While these results are
often read as indicating the contradictory impulses of a fickle or irrational
public, a theory of accountability paints another picture—one of a
thoughtful and pragmatic public that is concerned about the failure of the
criminal justice system to deliver what they consider to be just outcomes.
a. Public Dissatisfaction
Take, for example, the oft-cited polling data indicating public
dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system.225 Perhaps most frequently
discussed is the item in the General Social Survey (GSS) that asks
respondents about their perception of the sentences that courts hand
down.226 The percentage of respondents who feel that court sentences for
criminal offenders are “about right” has never, in the thirty years of the
survey, exceeded 20 percent.227 Around three-quarters of Americans feel—
and have felt rather consistently across the same period—that criminal
offenders are treated “not harshly enough” by courts.228 The longitudinal
GSS data are supplemented by a host of other polls conducted over the last
ten years that have found, variously: that by more than two to one,
Americans prefer “impos[ing] stricter sentences on criminals” over
“increas[ing] the amount of police on the street” as a way “to solve the
225.
See, e.g., Paul J. Hofer & Courtney Semisch, Examining Changes in Federal Sentence
Severity: 1980–1998, 12 FED. SENT’G REF. 12 (1999) (reporting a public “perception that too
many criminals were getting off easy”); Julie R. O’Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines’ Modified Real-Offense System, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1342, 1392 (1997) (“Reference to
opinion polls . . . would seem to indicate that a majority of the public is a great deal more
concerned with punishing and incapacitating offenders for very long periods of time than it is
about the process issues that preoccupy the academy.”).
226.
The General Social Survey (GSS) is the most extensive longitudinal survey of
American public opinion. The item asks: “In general, do you think the courts in this area deal too
harshly or not harshly enough with criminals?” NAT’L OPINION RESEARCH CTR., CODEBOOK
VARIABLE:
COURTS,
(1998)
(presenting
the
GSS),
available
at
http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/GSS/rnd1998/merged/cdbk/courts.htm.
227.
Id.
228.
Id.
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country’s crime problem”;229 that more than four out of five Americans feel
that Congress should make “tougher crime enforcement legislation” a “high
priority”’;230 that over three-quarters strongly agree that “we should toughen
and strengthen penalties for convicted criminals”;231 and that nearly nine
232
out of ten favor or strongly favor “tougher sentences for criminals.”
As with the renewed interest in early American sanctions, polling data
showing public interest in tougher sanctions are generally interpreted as
indicating popular punitiveness.233 And on their face, these simple and
commonly cited data appear to support this reading. But as the more
experienced and cautious analysts of public opinion have noted,234 the
nuances of public sentiment are difficult to capture in single-item
questions,235 and the more one studies the responses, the less satisfying the
punitiveness explanation becomes.236
One initial indication that punitiveness may not be the best
characterization of public attitudes emerges when we look more closely at
public evaluations of the various components of the criminal justice system.
If the public were primarily frustrated with the laxity of the system, one
would think that it would be upset with the prosecutors who fail to charge,
the juries who fail to convict, or the judges who hand down lenient
sentences. Not so. When asked to distinguish between parts of the
criminal justice system, respondents give the highest approval ratings to
judges, juries, prosecutors, and police, while giving the lowest approval
229.
Survey conducted by CBS News, Oct. 27–Oct. 29, 1996, based on telephone
interviews with a national adult sample of 1077 (on file with author).
230.
Survey by Time & Cable News Network, conducted by Yankelovich Partners, June 30–
July 1, 1998, and based on telephone interviews with a national adult sample of 1024 (on file with
author).
231.
Survey by NBC News & Wall Street Journal, conducted by Hart & Teeter Research
Companies, Feb. 26–Mar. 1, 1998, and based on telephone interviews with a national adult
sample of 2004 (on file with author).
232.
Survey by U.S. News & World Report & Bozell Worldwide, conducted by KRC
Communications/Research, Feb. 6–Feb. 9, 1997, and based on telephone interviews with a
national adult sample of 1000 (reporting that 72 percent of adults “strongly favor” and another 17
percent “favor” “tougher sentences for criminals”) (on file with author).
233.
See, e.g., Bottoms, supra note 167, at 39–41 (describing archaic sanctions as part of the
rise of populist punitiveness); Garland, supra note 152, at 3 (describing the return of archaic
sanctions as punitive and as inexplicable within standard theories of social control); Simon, supra
note 186, at 219 (arguing that “[c]ruelty and pain, long treated as inappropriate ends of public
policy, are steadily making inroads into the discourse and practice of punishment”).
234.
See, e.g., Joseph E. Jacoby & Francis T. Cullen, The Structure of Punishment Norms:
Applying the Rossi-Berk Model, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 245 (1998).
235.
See id. at 251.
236.
Id. at 251–254 (describing the various problems with simple interpretations of
punitiveness).
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ratings to prisons, jails, probation, and parole.237 Even among those who
think that the criminal justice system is doing a good or excellent job
overall, prisons rank lowest with probation and parole a close second.238
Perhaps this might be read as ambiguous evidence still consistent with
punitiveness—a desire, perhaps, for still longer sentences. But here again
the data suggest another answer. The public does not appear to view more
prisons or longer prison terms as the solution to the problem of crime.
Instead, by a margin of nearly two to one, Americans favor fighting crime
through reforms that feature spending money on “social and economic
problems” over spending money on “police, prisons and judges.”239
Moreover, polls show that even those Americans who favor tougher
penalties support increased funding for social programs, including programs
for job creation and education.240
On the surface, this presents a puzzle: Are Americans hard- or softhearted? Conservatives and liberals alike have been quick to brandish the
data that support their respective positions, arguing for longer prison terms
on the one hand and for leniency on the other, but neither has much to say
about the seemingly contradictory data on the other side. Certainly the
public is dissatisfied, but with what, exactly?

237.
Attitudes Towards Crime and Punishment in Vermont: Public Opinion About an
Experiment with Restorative Justice, 1999, ICPSR 3016 (on file with author).
238.
Id. For comparably dismal evaluations of prison, probation and parole, see the 2003
Arkansas Crime Poll, available at http://plsc.uark.edu/arkpoll/2003/index.htm, in which Arkansans
rated state prisons as inspiring the lowest levels of confidence of all the aspects of the criminal
justice system. See also Justice Policy Institute, Maryland Voter Survey (2003), available at
http://www.treatnotjail.org/facts_md_poll_full.pdf (indicating that more Maryland residents would
cut prison spending than any other budget item).
239.
Survey by Texas A & M University & Sam Houston State University, conducted by
Public Policy Research Institute, Texas A & M University, June 6–June 26, 1995, and based on
telephone interviews with a national adult sample of 1005 (on file with author). See also BELDEN
RUSSONELLO & STEWART, OPTIMISM, PESSIMISM, AND JAILHOUSE REDEMPTION: AMERICAN
ATTITUDES ON CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND OVER-INCARCERATION (2001), available at
http://www.prisonsucks.com/scans/overincarceration_survey.pdf (reporting findings from a
national survey finding that only 7 percent of Americans feel that prisons are doing a “good” or
“excellent” job, 25 percent feel that prisons are doing a “fair” job, and 58 percent feel that prisons
are doing a “poor” or “very poor” job of rehabilitating prisoners); Survey by Life Magazine,
conducted by Gallup Organization, Mar. 30–Apr. 5, 1992, and based on telephone interviews
with a national adult sample of 1222 (reporting that 64 percent favored spending money on
“better education, job training and other programs to help prevent people from getting involved
in crime” over “improving law enforcement with more police, prosecutors, judges and prisons”)
(on file with author).
240.
Survey conducted by ABC News, Dec. 7–Dec. 18, 1982, and based on telephone
interviews with a national adult sample of 2464 (on file with author).
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b. What the Public Wants
One way to shed light on simpler measures of public discontent is to
examine how our most common sanctions differ from what most Americans
say that they would like criminal sanctions to look like. National polling
data on the type of sanctions that Americans approve of (summarized below
in Table A) show overwhelming support for sanctions that require offenders
to learn a trade, to work, and to obtain a basic education—and opposition
to programs conferring benefits on offenders, such as allowing spousal visits.
TABLE A
SUPPORT FOR CRIMINAL SANCTION REFORM241
Mandatory Literacy Programs
Mandatory Job Training Programs
Mandatory Correctional Labor Programs
Spousal Visits

92%
92%
87%
45%

From the perspective of accountability, the seemingly “hard” and “soft”
demands that Americans would make of criminal offenders are not
contradictory at all. Rather, most Americans view completion of a basic
education, learning a trade, and working at a job to be important
obligations that offenders should be required to meet. And when
education, job training, and work are presented as such, most Americans
heartily endorse sanctions that include them.
We can see the demand for accountability even more clearly if we
refine our analysis of attitudes toward prison labor. Unsurprisingly, as
indicated in the left column of Table B, those who support prison labor
generally also support requiring offenders to work for pay and to compensate
victims by a margin of over four to one (81 percent to 19 percent).
241.
TIMOTHY J. FLANAGAN & DENNIS R. LONGMIRE, NATIONAL OPINION SURVEY OF
CRIME AND JUSTICE (1995). Respondents were first asked: “Please tell me whether you
think . . . the following proposals are good ideas or bad ideas.” They were asked to respond to:
Mandatory Literacy Programs: “Require every prisoner to be able to read and write before he or
she is released from prison”; Mandatory Job Training Programs: “Require prisoners to have a skill
or to learn a trade to fit them for a job before they are released from prison”; Mandatory
Correctional Labor Programs version 1: “Keep prisoners busy constructing buildings, making
products or performing services that the state would have to hire other people to do”; Mandatory
Correctional Labor Programs version 2: “Pay prisoners for their work, but require them to return
two-thirds of this amount to their victims or to the state for the cost of maintaining the prison”;
Spousal Visits: “Permit spouses to spend some weekends each year with their husband or wife in
special guest houses within the prison grounds.”
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TABLE B
242

SUPPORT FOR PRISON LABOR WITH AND WITHOUT COMPENSATION
Mandatory Labor Generally
Good Idea Bad Idea Neither
Good Idea 81%
70%
71%
Bad Idea
4%
18%
4%
Mandatory Labor with a
Neither
15%
12%
25%
compensation requirement
Total
100%
100%
100%

But strikingly, as can be seen at the center of the top row of Table B, a
substantial majority of those who think that prison labor is a bad idea think
that requiring prisoners to work for pay and to compensate their victims
and the state is a good idea. Simply adding the requirement that prisoners
be paid and that their pay be used to compensate their victims and the state
appears to convert many of the holdouts on mandatory prison labor.
Surveys have measured public attitudes about alternatives to
imprisonment as well. Here again, the evidence points to accountability
rather than to punitiveness. As noted above, prisons are the aspect of the
criminal justice system with which Americans are least satisfied.243 And
when Americans are asked about strategies for reducing prison
overcrowding, their favorite option is sentencing nonviolent offenders to
mandatory work programs in the community.244 Indeed, the most direct
measures of these attitudes indicate that Americans prefer this to building
more prison beds by nearly three to one.245
c. The Politics of Accountability
But even if a substantial majority of Americans support these
accountability-reinforcing sanctions, perhaps the statistics conceal a
political or ideological divide that would frustrate reform. Liberals, for
example, are more than twice as likely as conservatives to believe that
rehabilitation should be the primary goal of the criminal justice system and
242.
Id. For simplicity’s sake, I exclude “don’t know” and “refused” responses. See supra
note 241, for text of each item.
243.
Id.
244.
Id. “Would you favor or oppose each of the following measures that have been
suggested as ways to reduce prison overcrowding?” Eighty-nine percent of respondents thought
the following was a “good idea:” “Developing local programs to keep more nonviolent and firsttime offenders active and working in the community.” Thirty-three percent of respondents
thought the following was a “good idea:” “Increasing taxes to build more prisons.”
245.
Id.
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are nearly twice as likely to oppose the death penalty; the opinions of
Republicans and Democrats show a similar disparity.246 Those who support
accountability-reinforcing programs might thus be disproportionately
Democratic or Republican, liberal or conservative.
Indeed, the historical transformation of American sanctions arguably
derives from an ideological debate over the what American society should
look like. Unable to agree on other sanctions, reformers of all stripes have
stripped criminal sanctions down to their lowest common denominator:
liberty deprivation. Perhaps, then, accountability-reinforcing sanctions run
afoul of the same conflicts that spelled the demise of both flogging and
prisoner-empowerment programs.
The data suggest otherwise, however. While the public is divided over
both soft proposals for increased leniency and protection of defendants’
rights and hard proposals for longer prison terms and more punitive
sanctions, survey data reveal support for accountability-reinforcing
sanctions that crosses ideological and party lines. As indicated in Table C,
while there is some partisan and ideological variation in support for
penalties that don’t enhance accountability (spousal visits and allowing
parole boards to release offenders early, for example) there is little variation
in the overwhelming support for sanctions penalties that do: mandatory
community labor, mandatory literacy and job training, and mandatory labor
while incarcerated.
TABLE C

Moderate

Conservative

Democrat

Independent

Republican

Mandatory Work in Community
Mandatory Education
Mandatory Job Training
Mandatory Prison Labor
Spousal Visits
Allow Parole Board to Release

Liberal

SUPPORT FOR ACCOUNTABILITY-BASED REFORMS CROSSES IDEOLOGICAL
AND PARTY LINES

92%
89%
89%
88%
55%
33%

89%
93%
93%
87%
47%
19%

88%
93%
94%
86%
41%
14%

90%
91%
92%
89%
48%
21%

87%
90%
93%
85%
45%
21%

90%
91%
91%
91%
47%
18%

246.
Fourteen percent of conservatives versus 29 percent of liberals, and 14 percent of
Republicans versus 24 percent of Democrats agreed that the “most important” purpose in
sentencing adults should be “to train, educate and counsel offenders.” Id.
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There is even consensus on accountability-reinforcing sanctions in one
of the most contentious areas of the criminal law: the war on drugs. Most
Americans believe that we are losing the war on drugs,247 but they don’t
want to stop fighting it.248 What divides many Americans is how to engage
the enemy. Generally speaking, while progressives favor expanding drug
treatment on demand, conservatives view it as less effective than punishing
249
criminal offenders. But as with prison labor, support becomes bipartisan
when drug treatment is made mandatory and combined with additional
sanctions rather than voluntary and without additional sanctions.
Moreover, not only do the vast majority of citizens want to require
drug offenders to complete some kind of drug treatment program, by a more
than a five-to-one margin, citizens want judges to provide oversight of
criminal justice agencies to make sure that drug addicts complete some kind
of treatment program as well.250 The public doesn’t want more of the same;
it wants the criminal justice system to require offenders to meet reasonable
obligations promulgated by that system.
Why don’t accountability-reinforcing sanctions run afoul of the same
political problems as sanctions that are more purely rehabilitative or
punitive?
By reframing socially beneficial programs as mandatory,
accountability-reinforcing sanctions transform what was previously a
liberty-enhancing benefit into a liberty-reducing obligation. And by
combining elements that satisfy diverse concerns—punishment for
conservatives and social-welfare enhancement for liberals—it allows
individuals to view these sanctions in light of their own moral
commitments.251 Dan Kahan and I have described this phenomenon as
247.
For example, 65 percent of liberals and 64 percent of conservatives feel that the war on
drugs has had “no effect on the amount of drug use” in their communities. Id.
248.
FLANAGAN & LONGMIRE, supra note 241.
249.
Conservatives, for example, are more likely—and liberals are less likely—than the
general population to: oppose drug legalization; believe that punishment or punishment combined
with treatment is more effective than treatment alone; and believe that military interdiction and
policing are more effective than education and drug treatment. Id.
250.
FLANAGAN & LONGMIRE, supra note 241. Respondents were asked: “Some people
think that courts should stick to their traditional role of looking at the facts in a specific case and
then applying the law. Other people think that it is now necessary for the courts to go beyond
that role and try to solve the problems that bring people into court. I am going to read you a few
statements about the role of the court. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat
disagree, or strongly disagree that courts should . . . [o]rder a person to go back to court and talk to
the judge about their progress in a treatment program.”
251.
Alternatively, accountability may have a single meaning that most Americans agree
on, the kind of “overlapping consensus” on criminal sanctions that liberal democratic theory
aspires to. See, e.g., John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 223, 229 (1985) (“[J]ustification is addressed to others who disagree with us, and therefore it
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“social-meaning overdetermination.”252 On this account, competing social
groups need not agree on the philosophical foundations of punishment;
they need only find policies that they agree are acceptable notwithstanding
their diverse worldviews.253
C.

A Return to Accountability

Portraits of the public as excessively punitive are, in the end,
misleading. In more thorough and nuanced measures of popular sentiment,
we begin to see what the public really means when it demands tougher
sanctions: The public believes that the criminal justice system should hold
criminal offenders accountable by forcing them to meet reasonable
obligations, and that simple detention alone does not provide this form of
accountability. Liberty deprivation may be a reasonable means to the end
of accountability, but it is not an end in and of itself. Americans are not
soft on crime, but neither are they irrationally punitive. Instead, given a
chance, they tell us that they want programs that enhance offender
accountability.
Justice Holmes once stated, “The first requirement of a sound body of
law is, that it should correspond with the actual feelings and demands of the
community, whether right or wrong.”254 In the instant case of criminal
sanctions, the community is right, and the law has drifted too far from the
feelings and demands of the public. Sadly, neither reformers on the left nor
the right offer much in the way of an alternative. Overly concerned with
the rehabilitative ideal and offender rights, liberals have ignored the
reasonable demands of the public for sanctions that constrain offender

must always proceed from some consensus, that is, from premises that we and others publicly
recognize as true; or better, publicly recognize as acceptable to us for the purpose of establishing a
working agreement on the fundamental questions of political justice.”).
252.
Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan, Overcoming the Fear of Guns, the Fear of Gun
Control, and the Fear of Cultural Politics: Constructing a Better Gun Debate, __ EMORY L.J.
(forthcoming __) (manuscript at 22 on file with authors).
253.
See id. A note of caution is warranted. Accountability, while not as narrowly secular
as purely punitive or rehabilitative options, could be subject to ideological capture in the future.
If, for example, accountability were to be stripped of its overdetermined aspects and made into
merely a code for nonmandatory programming privileges for offenders, or if the demand for
accountability were merely used to heap insurmountable burdens on already stigmatized and
burdened populations, it could produce proposals as inert as those now made by punishment
purists. It is for precisely this reason that articulating a coherent and thorough conception of
accountability is so important.
254.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 41 (Dover Publications 1991)
(1881).
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autonomy.255 And, overly concerned with retribution talk and being tough
on criminals, conservatives have ignored the public demand for sanctions
that hold offenders accountable to others. Both see the public as either
supporting their view or being confused and immoral, and both miss an
important moral and pragmatic middle ground.
A fair reading of both history and the contemporary historical moment
reveals not a gullible or immoral public, but a subtle, rational, and highly
principled public worthy of far more respect than either progressive or
conservative commentators have given it to date. Indeed, if those of us
interested in responsible reform would only listen more carefully, we might
learn something valuable about how to craft policies that are moral,
effective, and politically viable.
But if we are to develop accountability-reinforcing sanctions, we will
need examples of how they can work in the real world. In what follows I
describe how states are negotiating their way out of the rut of lowestcommon-denominator punishment. By paying closer attention to both
social meaning and social costs, legislators, administrators, and activists
have begun to develop sanctions that are both expressively rich enough to
satisfy our contending moral ambitions and pragmatically effective enough
to satisfy the social needs of our communities. Unsurprisingly, these
approaches prominently feature offender accountability.

IV.

ACCOUNTABILITY AND CONTEMPORARY REFORM

State executives, legislators, and administrators know that the
American system of punishment is broken. Indeed, it is hard to find a state
that has not, in the last few years, ordered its sentencing commission to
256
The
investigate ways to better hold criminal offenders accountable.
255.
See Kahan, supra note 54, at 596 (describing reasons why liberals neglect retribution in
their proposed alternatives to incarceration). That retributiveness is part of what comprises most
people’s conception of punishment has been fairly well demonstrated. See, e.g., Kenworthey Bilz
& John M. Darley, What’s Wrong With Harmless Theories of Punishment, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1215 (2004).
256.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-25-37 (Supp. 2004) (specifying, under Article 2 of the
Alabama Sentencing Reform Act of 2003, that released offenders should be both reintegrated into
society and held accountable for their offenses); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-27-105(a) (2004)
(defining the purpose of the Board of Corrections as “manag[ing] correctional resources in the
state such that offenders are held accountable for their actions”); 2004 Kan. Sess. Laws 92;
(creating the Kansas criminal justice recodification, rehabilitation and restoration project in order
to “[s]tudy[ ] and review[ ] programs which hold offenders responsible and accountable for such
offender’s actions and reduce[ ] recidivism”); MASS. ANN. SPEC. LAWS ch. 66, § 6(a) (Supp.
2005) (wherein Massachusetts has just ordered its sentencing commission to investigate ways to
hold criminal offenders “accountable”).
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solutions that they are developing, while promising,257 are contested and
often appear incoherent when viewed in light of existing theories of
punishment. And all of them exist in a context in which accountabilityreducing sanctions are still the norm. But the tenuous and haphazard
nature of these reforms can be taken as both discouraging and inspiring.
On the one hand, it suggests that a great deal of work needs to be done to
generate an approach to criminal sanctions that is genuinely attentive to
offender accountability. On the other hand, that these reforms have
succeeded at all suggests that, even in the absence of theoretical
justification, accountability-reinforcing sanctions have attained some
traction.
The aim of this part is not to endorse any of these reforms, but rather
to describe how a focus on accountability can provide them with the
conceptual coherence and analytical framework they now lack. This
framework is one that supports some aspects of these sanctions while also
pointing to problems and shortcomings.
A. Changing the Form of Punishment
1.

Community Corrections for Nonviolent Offenders

Progressive reformers have long argued that nonviolent offenders
should serve their sentences in the community, but such programs have
often been met with public controversy.258 Today, however, states are
broadening their use of community-based corrections in ways that address

The emphasis on accountability, while resurgent, is not new. Delaware, for example, has
structured its entire criminal code explicitly around offender accountability since 1987. See
Delaware Supreme Court Administrative Directive Number Sixty-Seven, September 15, 1987.
257.
“Smarter punishment” is the latest catchphrase. See, e.g., SMART SENTENCING: THE
EMERGENCE OF INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS (Byrne et al. eds., 1992). The phrase is intended to
promote sanctions that reduce crime at a lower cost than imprisonment. This approach to selling
new sanctions to the public and public officials is, I think, only half right. To be sure, successful
reform efforts should be smart about budgets and crime reduction, but they should also be smart
about the social meanings and social effects of the proposed sanctions.
258.
See Justice Policy Institute, supra note 238 (citing public opinion data on probation and
parole). Community corrections span a broad spectrum of sanctions from simple parole to
detention in a community correctional center with work release. The bulk of the controversy
focuses on the often arbitrary use of parole to control prison overcrowding rather than to promote
public safety and the lack of enforcement of conditions of parole. Only about half of parolees
meet the conditions of their parole and less than one fifth of parole violators are sanctioned. See
RONALD P. CORBETT, JR. ET AL., CENTER FOR CIVIC INNOVATION, CIVIC REPORT NO. 7:
“BROKEN WINDOWS” PROBATION: THE NEXT STEP IN FIGHTING CRIME (Aug. 1999), available at
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cr_7.htm.
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public concerns and move in the direction of greater offender
accountability.
Although by no means the norm, perhaps the largest shift in
community corrections is occurring in the area of nonviolent drug
offenders. Several states have begun to employ or are now evaluating
mandatory inpatient drug treatment as a first alternative to incarceration
for drug offenders. Consider, for example, the trend in popular referenda on
sanctions for drug offenders. In 1996, Arizona voters passed the Drug
Medicalization, Prevention, and Control Act of 1996,259 mandating courtsupervised drug treatment and education programs instead of incarceration.
Four years later, California voters enacted the Substance Abuse and Crime
Prevention Act of 2000.260 Citizens in both states eliminated judicial
discretion in sanctioning and prosecutorial discretion in the determination
of which defendants will participate in the programs.261 Similar acts have
begun to appear on the ballots in other states as well.262 Through each of
these programs, first time drug offenders can avoid prison and a felony
conviction if they plead guilty and complete an approved treatment
program.
Both programs are still relatively young, and the California program in
particular was dogged with lack of service capacity in the first year. But
subsequent years have increased capacity and both states are beginning
massive evaluations to refine their strategies. While the long-term effects
are not yet known, the early evaluations suggest the program is working as
anticipated: “Tens of thousands of people who were previously denied
treatment are getting it; hundreds of millions of dollars are being saved.
And as a result, individuals, their families and their communities continue
to get healthier.”263
259.
260.
261.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3412.01 (2001).
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1210, 3063; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 1999 (Supp. 2006).
See Lisa Rosenblum, Note, Mandating Effective Treatment for Drug Offenders, 53
HASTINGS L.J. 1217, 1221 (2002) (“The Arizona and California Acts offer the best of both
penological worlds. Like the drug treatment courts, the initiatives treat drug offenders while
saving prison beds for violent offenders. But unlike the drug treatment courts, the Acts operate
without the arbitrary and unfair decision-making that has plagued the rehabilitative regime in the
past.”).
262.
See, e.g., Daniel Barbarisi, Ballot Initiatives to Cover Taxes, Health Care, and Dog Racing,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 6, 2000, at B2 (describing a ballot measure in Massachusetts proposing the
creation of “a ‘drug treatment trust fund’ to pay for drug treatment programs, bankrolled largely by
money seized in drug-related arrests”).
263.
Josh Richman, Drug Treatment Law Gets High Marks, Oakland Tribune, July 17, 2003,
at
2,
available
at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4176/is_20030717/ai_n14555376/pg_2
(quoting
Daniel Abrahamson).
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Mandatory Program Participation in Correctional Settings

Similar reforms are being undertaken in correctional settings. The
benefits of correctional education and drug treatment programs, while
264
extensively documented, have long faced a social-meaning problem.
While criminal justice reformers understand the beneficial effects that
education and drug treatment can have on an offender’s sobriety,
employment, and recidivism, such programs are normally available to
265
relatively few inmates. Despite their cost-effectiveness, legislatures have
been reluctant to fund them. Why? One reason is that such programs are
often presented as perks for inmates. As one expert, reviewing the
literature for the Office of National Drug Control Policy, lamented,
“[t]reatment programs are often portrayed as easy, minimally intrusive, and
a privilege.”266 Framed in this way, the social meanings conveyed by
educational and drug treatment programs are a political disaster.
But reformers in a growing number of states have found that by making
correctional education and drug-treatment programs mandatory, they are
able to effectively flip the social meaning of implementation from privilege
to obligation, making the political case for these welfare-enhancing
programs far more palatable.267 By presenting such programs as “restrict[ing]
freedom by limiting the activities of the participants, limiting peer
association, changing residence, and requiring participation in a variety of
activities such as self-help groups,”268 advocates have significantly enhanced
the political viability of these programs and opened the door to increased
state and federal funding.269 As a result, “mandating offender participation
264.
For example, despite the popular belief that treatment must be voluntary to be
effective, several studies now show that mandatory treatment is at least as effective as voluntary
treatment. See M. Douglas Anglin et al., The Effectiveness of Coerced Treatment for Drug-Abusing
Offenders, 62 FED. PROBATION 3 (1998).
265.
See FAYE S. TAXMAN, REDUCING RECIDIVISM THROUGH A SEAMLESS SYSTEM OF
CARE: COMPONENTS OF EFFECTIVE TREATMENT, SUPERVISION, AND TRANSITION SERVICES IN
THE COMMUNITY (1998), available at http://www.bgr.umd.edu/pdf/coerced_tx_12%20steps.pdf.
266.
Id. at 7.
267.
See Norval Morris, Comments to Franklin E. Zimring, Drug Treatment as a Criminal
Sanction, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 831, 834–35 (1993) (“[M]any prison administrators support the
boot camp movement, not because they think that the short, sharp shock of military-style
discipline will reform the criminal, but because that idea appeals politically, and to the public, and
will allow a shortening of the prison term and a movement to a follow-up period of communitybased treatment for drug abusers so sentenced.”).
268.
TAXMAN, supra note 265, at 7.
269.
See Rebecca Kolberg, Washington News, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, Mar. 15,
1990, available at http://www.lexis.com (search “News, All (English, Full Text)” for “Rebecca
Kolberg” and with date restriction from “01/03/1990” to “01/04/1990”) (noting that the “Bush
administration has increased federal funding for drug treatment 70 percent since fiscal 1989 and
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in education programs” and “[u]sing legal coercion to force drug-addicted
offenders into treatment is enjoying more favor than ever.”270
This shift is well timed, as the practical benefits of correctional drug
treatment and education have never been clearer. For example, a report
used recently conducted for the U.S. Department of Justice on the efficacy
of programs that test all nonviolent offenders and divert all of those who
test positive into mandatory drug treatment rather than prison.271 This
report found that these programs not only had a substantial impact on drug
dependency and recidivism,272 but also, unsurprisingly, significantly reduced
273
The same evaluation
relationship problems in the offender’s family.
indicates that in many cases, expansion of mandatory education and drugtreatment programs also significantly reduce the likelihood of employment
problems—the reverse of the effect of days spent in jail.274 Mandatory
participation, by highlighting offender accountability, makes these
programs morally and politically sensible as well.275
Still, the studies have been largely focused on offenders themselves,
and the theory of accountability suggests that the benefits are likely to be
far broader. Are prosocial norms regarding family life, work, or education
more pervasive and influential in communities in which high quality drug
treatment is available compared with communities where it is not? Do
people perceive sanctions that include mandatory drug treatment and
education to be more just, and does that perception increase compliance
and cooperation with the law? Large-scale studies with these specific effects

this year allocated $100 million to help states reduce waiting lists of people seeking treatment”).
In addition to federal funding, citizens in some states have voted for mandatory drug treatment as
an alternative to incarceration. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
270.
JENNIFER TRONE & DOUGLAS YOUNG, BRIDGING DRUG TREATMENT AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE (1996).
271.
272.
See ADELE HARRELL ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE JUSTICE POLICY CENTER,
EVALUATION
OF
BREAKING
THE
CYCLE
(2003),
available
at
http:/www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/410659_BreakingtheCycle.pdf; see also Alan Turley et al., Jail
Drug and Alcohol Treatment Program Reduces Recidivism in Nonviolent Offenders: A Longitudinal
Study of Monroe County, New York’s, Jail Treatment Drug and Alcohol Program, 48 INT’L J.
OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 721 (2004) (assessing recidivism in drug treatment
programs).
273.
HARRELL ET AL., supra note 272, at II-23 to II-32.
274.
Id. at II-2 to II-14.
275.
It is also worth noting that, despite the widespread misperception that drug treatment
only works for those who “have hit bottom” and “really want to change,” in correctional settings
mandatory drug treatment is at least as effective as optional drug treatment, if not more so. See
NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT COLUMBIA UNIV., BEHIND BARS:
SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND AMERICA’S PRISON POPULATION (1998).
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in mind have yet to be undertaken, but what we do know provides good
reason to think that the answer to these questions will be “yes.”
3.

Intensive Supervision Programs

States have also sought to substitute expressive quality for quantity
through so-called “intensive sanctions,” which generally require offenders
to satisfy some combination of educational, job training, employment,
community service, or restitution requirements, often in a quasi-military
atmosphere. They are also, as a rule, significantly less lengthy than
sanctions that include only empty time in a jail or prison. Again, from an
accountability-reinforcing perspective, these indicate that the state can
achieve the same or better correctional results with a more meaningful and
less-costly sanction.
The concept of intensive sanctions is not new. The early penitentiary
was structured around the theory that, by exercising more complete social
control over an offender, the state could require him to behave in socially
responsible ways. The idea behind modern programs is similar: A shorter
and more intensive regime of discipline and training, it is thought, provides
the same or greater reductions in recidivism at a lower cost than
incarceration. Evaluation of these programs is ongoing and not yet
decisive.276 Nonetheless, there are a number of preliminary findings that are
promising.
New York, Illinois, and Louisiana have the most extensive and, by
most accounts, the most effective programs. These states integrate
intensive drug-treatment, educational, and job-training components into a
detailed and strictly monitored four- to six-month schedule. The program
in New York, for example, “stresses a highly structured and regimented
routine, considerable physical work and exercise, and intensive substance
abuse treatment.”277 Like the early American penitentiary system, its goals
include not only rigorous physical training and discipline, but also
“build[ing] character, [and] instill[ing] a sense of maturity and
responsibility.”278 As administrators reported:

276.
As one reviewer of intensive sanctions put it, the research suggests that outcomes “are
neither as good as the advocates assert nor as bad as the critics hypothesize.” Tomer Einat, ShockIncarceration Programs in Israeli Sanctioning Policy: Toward a New Model of Punishment, 36 ISRAEL L.
REV. 147m 170 (2002).
277.
Glenn S. Goord & Brion Travis, The Fifteenth Annual Shock Incarceration Report 1
(2003).
278.
Id.
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For every 500 hours of physical training plus drill and ceremony that
has led to the media calling it a “boot camp,” Shock Incarceration in
New York also includes 546 hours of the therapeutic approach to
treating addiction. . . . It also includes at least 260 mandatory hours
of academic education and 650 hours of hard labor, where inmates
work on facility projects, provide community service work, and work
on projects in conjunction with the Department of Environmental
279
Conservation.

Unlike the early penitentiary, however, these programs are not limited
to incarceration; instead, they explicitly integrate formal and informal
modes of social control.280 They attempt to increase offender accountability
by monitoring compliance with drug treatment and employment
requirements and by strengthening the offender’s relationships with family
and community members who can exert pressure on parolees to behave
responsibly.281 Integrating these aspects of social control under intensive
parole supervision—precisely the kind of parole the public has indicated it
282
283
In
wants —turns out to have positive effects on offender adjustment.
fact, the most extensive evaluation completed to date reports that, “[i]n
every State where information was available on supervision intensity,
positive adjustment increased when supervision intensity increased.”284
Again, by maximizing the practical and symbolic return on their
criminal justice investment, public officials are able to provide the same or
a higher level of public protection for each dollar spent when compared
with standard incarceration. The New York Department of Corrections, for
example, estimates that it has saved about a billion dollars over the last
fifteen years.285 Illinois estimates that it saves a more modest five million
dollars annually by diverting offenders who would otherwise go to prison
into its intensive incarceration and parole programs.286
279.
Thomas Coughlin, U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, July 25, 1989:1.
280.
The model is built around “control theory,” a well established criminological model.
See RONALD A. FARRELL & VICTORIA LYNN SWIGERT, SOCIAL DEVIANCE (1975).
281.
Goord & Travis, supra note 277, at 4.
282.
See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
283.
Robert Brame & Doris Layton MacKenzie, Shock Incarceration and Positive Adjustment
During Community Supervision: A Multisite Evaluation, in CORRECTIONAL BOOT CAMPS: A
TOUGH INTERMEDIATE SANCTION 275 (Doris L. MacKenzie & Eugene E. Hebert eds., 1996).
284.
Id. This counters concerns raised by previous researchers. See, e.g., Joan Petersilia &
S. Turner, Evaluating Intensive Supervision Probation/Parole: Results of a Nationwide Experiment,
Research in Brief, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice
(1993).
285.
Goord & Travis, supra note 277, at 15.
286.
ROGER E. WALKER JR., ILL. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, IMPACT INCARCERATION
PROGRAM 23 (2003) (“The net cost savings for FY03 were an estimated $4,965,163.”).
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But while mandatory education and drug treatment have few
opponents, many progressive reformers and activists have actively opposed
intensive supervision programs, describing them as “ineffective” and
“theoretically flawed.”287 They argue that, because it is the rehabilitative
aspects of these programs rather than their “get tough” or military features
that reduce recidivism,288 states should just offer offenders rehabilitation
programs and dispense with the stringent requirements and tough
presentation.
Intensive accountability-reinforcing programs may not require a
289
But these rehabilitation
military veneer to have a rehabilitative effect.
purists who are presumptively skeptical of any sanction that appears tough
appear to miss much of what administrators are saying: By forcing offenders
to undergo intensive rehabilitation in a shorter time span, correctional
administrators are able to meet the moral demand for offender
accountability while reducing overall prison populations. States, by making
participation in rehabilitative programs mandatory under intensive
supervision, have begun to provide punishment that is both socially
meaningful and materially effective. Measured in terms of costs, benefits,
and public satisfaction, this is progress.290
287.
For example, Doris MacKenzie and Francis Cullen, two very capable proponents of
rehabilitation, admit to being theoretically predisposed against intensive supervision, proclaiming
that “get tough” programs are “theoretically flawed” and therefore necessarily ineffective. See
Francis T. Cullen, The Twelve People Who Saved Rehabilitation: How the Science of Criminology
Made a Difference, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 1, 21 (describing personal communication between the
scholars in which these sentiments were expressed).
288.
See, e.g., Francis T. Cullen et al., Control in the Community: The Limits of Reform?, in
CHOOSING CORRECTION INTERVENTIONS THAT WORK 76 (Alan T. Harland ed., 1996) (finding
that the military aspects of the boot camp had “negligible” effects on recidivism); Joan Petersilia
& Susan Turner, Intensive Probation and Parole, in CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH
(Michael Tonry ed., 1993) (finding that intensive incarceration and probation programs had no
effects on recidivism rates compared with simple parole).
289.
This is apparently what the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has decided in their
recent evaluation of their “Intensive Confinement Center Program” (ICC). See Memorandum
from Harley G. Lappin to all Federal Judges, Re: Intensive Confinement Ctr. Program (Jan. 14,
2005). Prevented by law from offering a reduction in prison time served, and unable to provide
more intensive postrelease supervision, the BOP did not realize the same return on investment as
some states. The BOP remains committed, however, to mandatory programming:
Rigorous research conducted over the past 20 years has demonstrated convincingly that
inmates who participate in the Bureau’s major inmate programs are substantially less
likely to recidivate as compared to similar inmates who do not participate. These
programs include Residential Substance Abuse Treatment, Vocational In the
memorandum I previously sent to all judges, I described results of several recidivism
studies, indicating that boot camps or ICC programs in general do not reduce recidivism.
Id.
290.
Indeed, stripped of their martial trappings, intensive supervision programs are
conceptually quite similar to the highly effective programs that most pro-rehabilitationists
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Rehabilitative purists also miss the potential indirect effects of
accountability-reinforcing sanctions on the perceptions and behavior of
other members of their communities. As members of their communities
come to see them as being required to behave responsibly, the theory of
accountability suggests that cooperation with the law should increase and
rates of crime should decrease. These effects are likely to be greater where
intensive sanctions can highlight the responsible behavior that offenders
are required to undertake.
Ultimately, whether in a correctional or community setting, the
development of effective intensive interventions suggests that reformers are
technically capable of designing programs that will benefit the most
disadvantaged in our society. Accountability, as reformers in some states
are beginning to realize, provides a moral language that allows them to do
so.
4.

Correctional Labor

Perhaps the most straightforward movement toward offender
accountability—the resurgence of interest in correctional labor—has also
been the most problematic.291 It is not hard to see where the controversy
comes from. Critics of correctional labor programs argue that they operate
much as they did in the South during reconstruction, simultaneously
exploiting black Americans while undermining organized free labor.292
strongly support: “multidimensional” and “multisystemic” programs for juveniles. The literature
on these kinds of programs is vast. Multsystemic work generally clusters around the work of Scott
Henggeler. See Scott W. Henggeler et al., Family Preservation Using Multisystemic Therapy: An
Effective Alternative to Incarcerating Serious Juvenile Offenders, 60 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCH. 953 (1992). For recent meta-analyses of program evaluations, see Nicola M. Curtis et al.,
Multisystemic Treatment: A Meta-Analysis of Outcome Studies, 18 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 411 (2004);
David P. Farrington & Brandon C. Welsh, Family-based Prevention of Offending: A Meta-analysis,
36 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 127 (2003); S.R. Woolfenden et al., Family and Parenting
Interventions for Conduct Disorder and Delinquency: A Meta-Analysis of Randomized Controlled Trials,
86 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 251 (2002). Both the “tough” and “caring” intensive
programs leverage formal control to build stronger social relationships, which then lead to better
informal control by family and friends—all while generating broad political support.
291.
See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 122.
292.
One recent editorial summarized all of the problems that nearly extinguished
correctional labor early in the twentieth century:
Prison corporations exploit prison labor in “factories behind fences.” Virtually free
prison slave labor has led to the shutdown of Northwest sawmills. Slavery is permitted
today because the slaves do not belong to the plantation owner, but to the state. They
are just “rented” to capitalist corporations. This is why America is buddy buddy with the
ruthless, brutal Communist butchers of China: We’ve got the same system.
Dan McKinnon, Letter to the Editor, Corporate Slavery, IDAHO STATESMAN, Feb. 28, 2004, at 8.
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While these concerns are legitimate, properly structured correctional labor
programs should be able to overcome them. Indeed, a number of possible
adjustments to federal and state correctional labor programs suggest that
partial solutions are already in the works. Below, I first describe some
promising programs and then discuss ways to address the legitimate
concerns they provoke.
a.

Nonprofit Labor

Many states have either dramatically expanded inmate nonprofit labor
programs or are making plans to do so in the near future. In Vermont, for
example, many prisoners are diverted to work camps where inmates “work
off” up to half of their sentence. The camps are far cheaper to operate than
traditional prisons, and inmates perform truly useful labor, such as “cutting,
delivering and stacking firewood for the needy; forestry management;
construction and rehabilitation of low-income housing, including
maintenance; services for towns; gardens for the poor; providing assistance
with daily living for the elderly; providing clerical and data entry assistance
to state agencies serving the needy.”293 While these programs are not
suitable for high-risk offenders, they are suitable for a broad middle-tier of
offenders who will be released in the near term.
A number of other states operate sophisticated programs that target
the large-scale nonprofit sector, like the programs in state prisons in
Michigan, Illinois, Texas, and Wisconsin where inmates build housing in
modules for Habitat for Humanity.294 As part of correctional training in the
building trades, these programs provide participating inmates with
improved prospects for finding a job upon release. The prison-made
modules are then transported to housing sites and assembled into finished
homes by Habitat volunteers.
Many municipalities operate less-sophisticated programs for short-term
offenders housed in local jails. Local sheriffs send inmates to clean streets,
293.
EDWARD R. ZUCCARO ET AL., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE [STATE OF
VERMONT] GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON CORRECTIONS OVERCROWDING (2004).
294.
See, e.g., Steve Pardo, National Guard, Habitat Team Up: Units Transport Walls Used to
Build Homes for Poor, DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 10, 2003, at O1C (“Under federal rules, Habitat for
Humanity of Michigan has to put yearly notices in local papers in the Howell, Jackson, Lansing,
Grand Rapids and Midland areas stating their intentions to use the National Guard to transport
the prefabricated walls, made by state prisoners, to about 400 sites from Jan. 1, 2005, through
2006.”). See also Peter Hoekstra & James P. Hoffa, Federal Prison Agency Preys on Workers,
DETROIT NEWS, June 20, 2003, at 15A (praising the Habitat for Humanity program as an
alternative to prison labor programs that hurt unionized labor).

53:5

Braman 2

Braman Final Read

(5/2/2006 3:48 PM)

70

53 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1 (2006)

clear drains, and trim hedges. Inmates also help churches and other
nonprofits, prepare for, manage, and clean up after major events; paint or
repair facilities; and even assist with technical administrative work.
Inmates, who often grew up in the neighborhoods they are serving, gain
experience and community contacts they can then use to obtain
employment when released.295
Nonprofit work programs are, of course, usually profitable to someone,
and the acceptability of such programs is likely to depend on precisely who
benefits and how. There is a world of difference, for example, between a
sanction that requires an inmate to labor for political elites (say, trimming
hedges at the governor’s house) and a sanction requiring an inmate to help
build houses or cut firewood for the poor in his own community. A theory
of accountability, however, can help distinguish between the two by asking
not only whether the offender is laboring, but also how that labor furthers
accountability in concrete ways and how the social meaning of that labor is
likely to affect behavior in the community.
b.

For-profit Labor

For-profit correctional labor is relatively uncommon in the United
States, but it is making some inroads in both small- and large-scale settings.
At the low end of the correctional labor market are programs like Oakland’s
RECOVER program.296 Because destitute offenders are generally unable to
compensate their victims, sanctions against them are generally less efficient
than sanctions against employed offenders. Under the RECOVER program,
unemployed offenders have the option of working a menial job for an
employer who contracts with the state. The contractor donates ten dollars
for each hour the offender works,297 all of which is passed on to the victim in
restitution. In essence, the state serves as a broker, connecting employers
with indigent laborers who need to meet a legal obligation. The offender
gets access to an entry-level job with a shot at further employment if he
performs well. The employer pays a decent wage, but only hires the
offender for the hours necessary, thereby avoiding overhead. And, of
course, the victim is compensated—indeed, in one year under the Oakland
295.
See infra Part I.C.2, discussing the effects of social norms.
296.
See Stephen W. Huber, RECOVER Works for Victims, DAILY OAKLAND PRESS, Mar. 4,
2004, available at http://www.theoaklandpress.com/stories/030404/loc_20040304027.shtml
(describing the RECOVER program). RECOVER stands for Restitution Equals Compensation of
Victims’ Economic Rights. Id.
297.
This arrangement avoids the complication of taxing the wages.
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program, judges report that orders of restitution, once an “empty gesture,”298
now retrieve “nearly 100 percent of what was owed.”299
At the upper end of the correction labor market are programs like the
Federal Prison Industries Enhancement (PIE) program.300 Under PIE,
private firms are allowed to employ prison labor so long as they are paid a
prevailing wage and do not displace free labor. Employers must pay the full
panoply of taxes and insurance costs, and wages are garnished to
compensate victims, to support dependants, to pay for the inmates’ room
and board, and to meet other obligations. PIE provides state and local
taxpayers, victims, and dependants with tens of millions of dollars each
year. Recent and pending reforms are aimed at both expanding the use of
PIE labor, particularly where it would compete with foreign labor, while
restricting competition with other domestic labor sources.
c.

Concerns about Correctional Labor

Many correctional labor programs are far less attractive than those
outlined above. California, for example, found itself the target of a lawsuit
for contracting with companies who were illegally using low-wage (and
disproportionately minority) prison labor to compete with domestic
companies employing free noncorrectional labor. Such practices give rise
to familiar concerns from the early days of the penitentiary: racial
subordination and competition with free labor.
(1)

Racial Subordination

Given America’s historical use of slavery, convict leasing, and other
abusive and racially exploitative tragedies, serious and legitimate concerns
about racial subordination attach to any form of involuntary labor. In light
of the potential for abuse, any implementation of mandatory labor programs
as part of punishment should be subjected to a careful review of any possible
subordinating effects.
But accountability and antisubordination principles are not
incompatible. By paying decent wages, for example, both small- and large-

298.
Amy Lee, Oakland Crime Victims Get Their Due: New Program Sends Indigent Criminals
to Work, But Paychecks Used for Restitution, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 4, 2004, at 1A (quoting a
victims advocate whose daughter was killed by a drunk driver as saying, “‘Pay restitution’ is a nice
thing to say, but it’s an empty gesture because people simply don’t do it.”).
299.
Id. (quoting Judge Bob Evans of Florida’s 9th Circuit Court).
300.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1761(c) (2000).
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scale programs help victims and families of prisoners in low income
neighborhoods—precisely those neighborhoods currently harmed by both
crime and overincarceration. Increasing the portion of income allocated to
family support would not only help to alleviate poverty in many of our
nation’s poorest neighborhoods, but it would also help to build the familial
bonds that studies show to be important in reducing offender recidivism.301
And, because the removal of large portions of able-bodied young men from
low-income neighborhoods further lowers tax revenues, offenders might be
required to contribute some portion of their pay to the city where they
originally resided. All of this would help to direct funds into impoverished
neighborhoods from which productive labor has been removed, which
would help to create a more equitable distribution of wealth.302
(2)

Competition with Free Labor

Another serious and legitimate concern is that prison labor may
unfairly compete with nonprison labor, resulting in diminished wages for
and increased unemployment among nonoffenders.
There is no single answer to this concern, but there are a host of
partial answers.303 First, a requirement that correctional labor programs pay
304
free-market wages may alleviate this concern. Second, many of the jobs
that correctional labor competes for are not American jobs, but jobs that
have already been outsourced overseas. Indeed, the federal prison industries
program—which is by far the largest correctional labor program in the
nation—operates under the constraint that it cannot compete with
domestic labor.305
But this only addresses part of the concern, for there would certainly
be some job reallocation within the United States as a result of large-scale
301.
See TRAVIS, supra note 77, at 119–50 (reviewing the literature on the effects of
incarceration on families and the effects of family ties on recidivism).
302.
Those worried that public support for prison labor is—at root—racist, should be further
reassured by the fact that a substantial majority of those who support offender work programs in
general also support requirements that would direct benefits to disadvantaged minority
populations (for example, by earmarking a portion of earnings for offenders’ victims, families, or
communities). See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
303.
My argument is admittedly speculative. This issue deserves extensive empirical study.
304.
Many states that mandate prison labor also have prevailing wage requirements, as do
federal correctional industries. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 14-8-4 (2005); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1208
(West 2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 18-90b (2004); 50 Fed. Reg. 12,661-64 (1985).
305.
Indeed, PIE certification requires that programs be voluntary, avoid unfair competition
with private sector business and labor, and provide hourly wage rates not less than those
prevailing for similar work in the locality. See Prison Industry Enhancement Certification
Program Guideline, 64 Fed. Reg. 17,000 (Apr. 7, 1999).
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expansion of correctional labor programs. However, it is not clear that this
would hurt free labor. The question is whether the redistribution is
necessarily a zero-sum proposition or whether correctional labor can
effectively “grow the labor pie.” For example, correctional labor arguably
could expand free labor employment by creating greater market efficiencies
in areas where incarceration is common.
To understand how this might occur, first think about how increased
crime diminishes the number of jobs in a neighborhood and how increased
unemployment increases crime rates, creating a vicious cycle that lands far
too many inner-city residents out of work and in prison. Rising crime rates
drive some employers out of business altogether, creating a net loss in jobs.
But even if businesses relocate, their access to local markets and free labor’s
access to employment are reduced because the employer and the
unemployed workers will be less available to each other. This further
depresses formal market employment and encourages informal and often
illegal market activity.306 The inefficiencies created by this cycle ultimately
drive down formal employment levels not only at the local level, but at the
macro level as well. This is, for economists and labor activists alike, a
miserable story of a shrinking pie.307
While there is not much evidence that correctional labor directly
increases the number of jobs in high-crime, low-income neighborhoods, a
properly structured program might do so indirectly through a host of
second-order effects. Under a correctional labor regime that focuses on
accountability, the profits accrue mostly to the victims, families, and
communities of offenders; this increases overall household incomes and
local wealth, helping to reduce poverty, keep families intact, and cut crime.
The increased purchasing power of residents may also encourage business
expansions and new businesses, all of which, in turn, help to create new
jobs. Increased income and employment, consequently, can help to reduce
crime rates, which increases business opportunities and employment. These
effects may be bolstered by the normative effects of accountability on
community and family life described above.308 Would the gains be greater
than the costs related to job loss in areas out-competed by correctional
labor? A great deal more research is needed to settle these issues decisively,
306.
307.

See Richard Freeman, America’s Punishment Industry, PROSPECT (U.K.) Feb. 5, 1996.
Bruce Western has done some of the best work in this area. See BRUCE WESTERN,
PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (“[E]x-prisoners earn lower wages and suffer more
unemployment than similar men who have not been incarcerated. Ex-prisoners are also less likely
to get married or cohabit with the mothers of their children.”) (manuscript on file with author).
308.
See supra Part I.C.2.
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but there are good reasons to think that they would,309 and that holding
criminal offenders accountable to their victims, families, and communities
need not pit free labor against correctional labor.
I do not mean to minimize concerns about free labor, nor am I
attempting a comprehensive account of how correctional labor ought to be
evaluated. The role of mandatory labor programs in and out of correctional
institutions raises serious questions about the appropriate context, form, and
scope of state control over offender autonomy, and about the effects of any
displacement of free labor that may occur. But as the federal government
and states look to increase participation in correctional labor programs—
and to do so with significant public support—an analytical framework
structured around offender accountability suggests ways to make the most of
their experiments and empirical evaluations.
5.

More Productive Sanctions

Focusing on accountability when structuring sanctions can help us to
more justly parse the burdens and benefits that the law creates. Americans
rightly want to hold criminal offenders accountable in ways that simple
detention cannot. They overwhelmingly support mandatory paid labor, the
fruits of which accrue to third parties harmed by crime and incarceration.
The technical problems associated with correctional employment appear to
be manageable.310 The real question is whether we can construct programs
that generate a just distribution of the fruits of that labor—a question that
an approach structured around offender accountability can help us answer.
B.

Accountability and Restorative Justice: An Alternative Approach to
Alternative Sanctions

One of the most interesting accountability-related developments of
the last two decades—the restorative justice movement—is ostensibly not

309.
This is because the marginal effect of a dollar in the neighborhoods where offenders
come from is likely to be higher than the marginal effect of a dollar elsewhere. One reason for this
is that the marginal crime rate associated with reduced income is nonlinear, so that the most
dramatic reductions occur at the low end of the spectrum—the end disproportionately populated
by the victims, families, and neighbors of offenders.
310.
See, e.g., Thomas W. Petersik, Tapan K. Nayak & M. Katie Foreman, Identifying
Beneficiaries of PIE Inmate Incomes Who Benefits from Wage Earnings of Inmates Working in
the Prison Industry Enhancement (PIE) Program? Report to The George Washington University
Center for Economic Research (July 1, 2003).
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about sanctions at all.311 Nevertheless, restorative justice can be seen as a
search for a far-reaching and thorough form of accountability, not just of
the offender to nonoffenders, but also of nonoffenders to the offender.
Understanding the similarities and distinctions between the aims and
means of restorative justice and accountability-enhancing sanctions reveal
both compatibilities as well as the relative strengths and shortcomings of
each.
While diverse in attitudes and approach, a common theme in the
restorative justice literature can be found in its dissatisfaction with the
state’s ability to “steal” conflicts from private citizens, robbing individuals of
the ability to resolve conflicts that have complex sources without
employing the blunt and generally ineffective tools of formal criminal
proceedings.312 As a response to this, advocates of restorative justice favor
quasi-civil conferences in which the victim and any others interested in the
victim’s welfare meet with the offender and any others interested in the
offender’s welfare.313 John Braithwaite has suggested that restorative justice
is “[a] procedural requirement that the parties talk until they feel that
harmony has been restored on the basis of a discussion of all the injustices
they see as relevant to the case.”314 The goal of each conference is to restore
property, a sense of security, and dignity to the victim, while also
encouraging the offender to participate in that restoration by applying
social pressure and providing social support specific to the situation at
hand.315
Because one of the most obvious ways for an offender to repair damage
that he has imposed on another is to apologize and provide some form of
compensation, the likelihood that restorative justice proceedings will result
in a requirement that the offender meet some prosocial obligation is high.316
There are, however, distinctions between restorative justice and an

311.
Gerry Johnstone, Introduction, Restorative Approaches to Criminal Justice, in A
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE READER 5–6 passim (Gerry Johnstone ed., 2003) (describing restorative
justice as “civilizing” the criminal law).
312.
See generally Nils Christie, Conflicts as Property, 17 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1977).
313.
See id.; Johnstone, supra note 311, at 8–14 (describing restorative justice as “civilizing”
the criminal law).
314.
John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and a Better Future, in A RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
READER 83, 87 (Gerry Johnstone ed., 2003).
315.
Id.
316.
While, in theory, the victim and offender can decide to do anything that they choose,
mediators are often encouraged to guide them toward a resolution that reflects “obligations
created by the offense.” HOWARD ZEHR, RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 13
(1985).
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approach focused on the accountability-related concerns described in this
Article.
Whereas accountability-reinforcing sanctions can be described
independently of the criminal justice process, restorative justice is generally
described as requiring a process in which people affected significantly by the
criminal offense meet “to discuss the harm caused by the offence and to
decide, collectively, how the harm should be repaired.”317
While
accountability concerns focus agnostically on offenders meeting the
obligation of responsible behavior, restorative justice often emphasizes
“caring,” “love,” “compassion,” “redemption,” “forgiveness,” and
“reconciliation,” while rejecting the labels of “crime,” “offender,” “victim,”
and “punishment.”318
Generally speaking, then, the form of accountability implicit in the
sanctions that I have described allows for a more generic approach focused
on appropriate outcomes, an approach compatible with restorative justice
and also with indeterminate and determinate sentencing in a more
traditional criminal justice process. It does not require major procedural
reform, that victims confront the victimizer, or the consent of the
offender—aspects of restorative justice that, even though they may be
desirable in some circumstances, limit the circumstances to which
restorative justice is likely to be applied. But perhaps just as importantly, a
focus on accountability does not require that the public embrace the more
specific and sectarian goals and values of restorative justice. Reformers may
want to live in a world where offenders are loved and their dignity restored,
but to demand that world as part of reform significantly limits its appeal and
implementation.
Ultimately, although an emphasis on accountability forgoes some of
the potential benefits of restorative justice, it also avoids some of restorative
justice’s most serious limitations—and it does so while still insisting on a
socially constructive approach to sanctions.

317.
Johnstone, supra note 314, at 3; see also generally, Randy E. Barnett, Restitution: A New
Paradigm of Criminal Justice, 87 ETHICS 279 (1977) (describing the return of this process to the
individuals involved); ZEHR, supra note 316 (describing the importance of focusing on harms
related to the offense).
318.
Johnstone, supra note 314, at 5–6, passim.
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CONCLUSION

Although accountability features prominently in nearly every criminal
319
code in our nation, runs through the earliest history of our criminal law,
and is overwhelmingly favored by the public, it has been largely missing
from the mainstream debate. The accountability of criminal offenders
features prominently in every election cycle, but policymakers have
delivered precisely the opposite—a blight of accountability-reducing
sanctions centered on incarceration, probation, and parole. We warehouse
criminal offenders or let them walk free because we cannot imagine doing
anything else. At tremendous cost to the welfare of those in high-crime
neighborhoods, and to the public’s trust in—and the legitimacy of—our
criminal justice system, we are failing.
Our system of criminal sanctions is broken and the dominant accounts
of punishment—whether framed in terms of retribution, deterrence,
expressive condemnation, or rehabilitation—have little to say about how to
fix it. We need a new approach, a new way of looking at what it is that
punishment can and should do. I argue that a framework structured around
broader offender accountability can provide just that. By attending to our
best understandings of human behavior and social organization, we can
fashion punishments that protect the important social goods on which
healthy families and communities depend.
An approach to punishment that features accountability has several
advantages over mainstream discussions that pit a convulsive popular
punitiveness against defenders of criminals’ rights. Ordinary citizens, the
evidence suggests, have a highly sophisticated moral sensibility and, given
the choice, support measures that convey not only disdain for criminality,
but a desire for social justice and concern for our collective social welfare.
Public dissatisfaction should not be read as mere bloodlust, but as a desire
for a far more meaningful and pragmatic form of justice.
A focus on accountability also provides practical guidance for future
reform—reform that is desperately needed. Holding criminal offenders
accountable has never been easy and likely never will be. But the stakes,
both moral and material, are too high not to try. Popular dissatisfaction
with—and the massive social costs of—imprisonment are forcing legislators
to reexamine their overreliance on incapacitation alone, and many are
devoting time and energy to reversing the trend toward mass incarceration.
In the process, some are beginning to rediscover the public’s interest in
319.
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accountability and are developing innovative programs to meet public
demand. This Article, I hope, will contribute to the conversations that
these reformers are having with each other and with the public at large.
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